B. P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.

( 1 ) DECREE holder is the petitioner. He obtained a decree for money against the respondent and filed E. P. No. 71/1972 for realising a sum of Rs. 9,722-40 ps. Meanwhile, the summer vacations intervened and the Courts reopened on 11-6-1973. On 14-6-1973 the judgement-debtor filed E. A. No. 43 of 1973 for recording part satisfaction to the extent of Rs. 8,603-95 Ps. According to him, on daughter in favour of the decree-holder for a sum of Rs. 5,500. 00 and further paid a sum of Rs. 3,103-95 p. in cash. Notice of the petition was given to the decree-holder who denied receiving any such payment or having purchased the car. He also pleaded that the judgement-debtors application is barred by Article 125 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court below enquired into the same and upheld the judgement-debtors plea that has paid a sum of Rs. 8,603-95 to the decree-holder, as alleged by him. It overruled the objection of the decree-holder relating to limitation relying upon S. 17 of the Limitation Act. Hence this Civil Revision Petition.

( 2 ) THE first question raised by Mr. M. V. Ramana Reddy, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner (decree-holder) is that the very application filed by the judgement-debtor for recording part satisfaction is barred by limitation and that, Section 17 has absolutely no application to the facts of the case and cannot operate to save limitation in favour of the judgement-debtor. He submitted that once limitation begins to run, no subsequent disability or inability can stop it. According to him, the period of thirty days prescribed by Art. 125 began to run on and from 9-5-1973 itself and, therefore, the alleged breach of undertaking on the part of the decree -holder (the undertaking contained in the receipt, Ex. A-1) to report the said part satisfaction to Court, cannot stop or suspend the running of limitation. He also submitted that the breach of the said undertaking, assuming that Ex. A-1 is true, does not amount to "fraud" within the meaning of Section 17. Counsel also disputed the finding arrived at by the Court below that Ex. A-1 is true and that the J. D. s daughters car was sold to the decree holder or that he was paid any money is cash.

( 3 ) BEFORE dealing with the legal contentions, I must refer to the relevant stipulation contained in Ex. A-1 which is a receipt said to have executed by the decree-holder. on 9-5-1973. For the purpose of this discussion, I will assume that Ex. A-1 is true. It contains an undertaking given by the decree-holder that immediately upon the reopening of the courts, he will get the satisfaction recorded to the extent of the amount paid under Ex. A-1. The argument of Mr. P. V. Sashaiah, the learned counsel for the judgement-debtor is that having expressly undertaken to get the part satisfaction recorded on the reopening of the Court, the decree-holder fraudulently and dishonestly to do so. The judgement-debtor was under the impression that the decree-holder would abide by his undertaking; but, when he enquired in the Court soon after it reopened, he came to know that no such satisfaction was got recorded by the decree-holder, he was not available. In those circumstances, the judgement-debtor himself applied to the Court to record the said satisfaction. The earliest he could apply, in the circumstances of the case, was on 14-6-`973. Learned Counsel contends that it must be assumed that the decree-holder was impugned with fraudulent intentions even on 9-5-973 and that, because of the said fraud on his part, the judgement-debtor is entitled to take advantage of S. 17)1) (a) of the Limitation Act and, for that reason, his application is within time.

( 4 ) ACCORDING to Art. 125 of the Limitation Act, l the period for getting an adjustment or satisfaction f a decree recorded is thirty days from the date when the payment or adjustment is made. " Sub-section (1) of Section 17 [counsel for the decree-holder relies upon only clause (a) and not upon clause

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