A compromise decree granting a mandatory injunction is a decree granting a mandatory injunction and is governed by Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a period of three years for the enforcement of such decrees.

( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of execution proceedings in O S. 14 of 1959. The suit which was filed for mandatory injunction was compromised. The compromise decree provided that the plaintiff shall do certain things and that the defendant agreed in his turn to close down the window and to construct a wall. There after the defendint sold the property to the present appellant. Plaintiffs 1 to 4 in their return sold their properties to the judgment-debtors 5 and 9, The transferee from the defendant (the present appellant) thereafter filed the present execution petition in order to enforce clauses 4 to 5 of the compromise decree. It was contended by the transferees from the plaintiffs that under order 21 Rule 16 the execution petition was not maintainable and that it was barred by time.

( 2 ) THE executing Court held that the execution petition was maintainable. However the contention as to limitation was not argued before the executing Court. Tnerefore it ordered the execution petition to proceed further. That order was challenged in appeal by the transferees from plaintiffs. The learned appellate Judge held that the execution petition was not mamtainable and that it was barred by limitation. It may be noted that the question of limitation was for the first time argued before the learned appellate Judge. He therefore allowed the appeal, set aside the order made by the executing court and dismissed the execution petition. It is that appellate order which is challenged by the defendant s transferee in this appeal. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant by Mr. Govindarajulu that the execution petition was not barred by time. He has relied upon article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a period of 12 years for the execution of any decree or order of a Civil Court other than a decree granting mandatory injunction. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that the execution petition was governed by Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and that therefore the excution petition was barred by time. Acticle 135 provides a period of three years for the enforcement of a decree granting mandatory injunction. The period of three years would either run from the date of decree or from the date of performance where such a date has been fixed. The controversy between the parties therefore has centred round the construction of the decree The question which has persen is whether the compromise decree under execution is a decree granting permanent injunction. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to turn to the decree. Clauses 4 to 6 which are sought to be enforced in the present execution proceedings provide as follows: under Clause 4 the existing latrine of the defendant is directed to be removed from its present location to the east and to be connected with the existing septic tank pit. Cause 5 requires the construction by the plaintiff of a passage from the western end of the latrine to further west in order to connect it with industrial Training Institute Road clause 6 requires the plaintiff to level the ground of the rear portion of defendant s house with hard material so that the rain water would easily pass from east to west and further to I. T. I. Road.

( 3 ) ALL the three clauses which are sought to be enforced in execution petition require the concerned party to do certain things obviously therefore they constitute a mandate and the directions incorporated in the clauses 4 to 6 of the decree under execution are a mandatory injunction. However it has been argued by Mr. Oovindarajulu that a compromise decree cannot be termed as a decree for mandatory injunction. According to him a decree for mandatory injunction is one which is passed by the court on merits of the case otherwise than by compromise. According to him a compromise decree does not represent the command of the court but merely represents the agreement between the parties with the seal of the court superimposed upon it.