1976 Supreme(AP) 106
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : PUNNAIAH
Kammili Venkataratnam - Appellant
Versus
Kammili Krishna Murthy - Respondent
Decided On : 07-12-76
The limitation period for execution of a decree starts from the date of the decree and continues to run even though the decree-holder's son was a minor.
Headnote:
LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - SECTION 6 - EXECUTION OF DECREE - MINORITY OF DECREE-HOLDER - LIMITATION STARTS FROM DATE OF DECREE AND CONTINUES TO RUN DESPITE MINORITY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE.
Fact of the Case:
Decree-holder died leaving behind a minor son as the sole surviving heir. The son filed an execution petition within three years of attaining majority. The judgment-debtor objected, arguing that the petition was barred by limitation as it was not filed within three years from the date when the decree-holder was supposed to receive a payment under the decree.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the limitation period started from the date of the decree and continued to run even though the decree-holder's son was a minor. The court relied on the decision in Ramakrishnaiah vs. Venkata Subba Rao, which held that once limitation begins to run, nothing stops it, including the subsequent disability of the legal representative of the decree holder.
Issues: Whether the limitation period for execution of a decree starts from the date of the decree or from the date when the decree-holder attains majority, if the decree-holder is a minor.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the limitation period for execution of a decree starts from the date of the decree and continues to run even though the decree-holder's son was a minor. The court relied on the decision in Ramakrishnaiah vs. Venkata Subba Rao, which held that once limitation begins to run, nothing stops it, including the subsequent disability of the legal representative of the decree holder.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the execution petition was barred by limitation.
( 1 ) AN important question of law has arisen in this appeal. The decree-holder died on 20-11-1956 leaving behind her son, the sole surviving heir. He was minor at the time of the death of the decree-holder. Within three years after attaining majority, the decree-holder s son filed E. P. 75/72. The judgment-debtor raised objection to the effect that the E. P. is barred by limitation in as much as it was not filed within the period of three years from 1-6-1956 on or before which date the 1st defendant judgement-debtor has to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/- to the deceased - decree - holder as per the terms of the compromise decree in O. S. No. 80/ 51 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Machilipatnam and as the limitation started from 1. 6 1956 even when the decree-holder was alive
( 2 ) THE Subordinate Judge accepted the objection in view of the decision in Kasam Umar vs. Gulam (1) (AIR 1956 Saurashtra, 20) and also the commentary on section 6 of the Limitation act 1963 by Chittaley and Row (4th edition at page 272 which is to the following effect. "where limitation begins to run against one person and thereafter another becomes entitled to sue on the same cause of action, there is no fresh start- ing point of limitation and the disability cf such person at the time of his so becoming entitled to sue is no ground for the extension of limitation under this section. "
( 3 ) THE Chief Justice of Saurashtra high Court in the above decision also held that limitation having once commenced to run it will not be interrupted by the fact of the plaintiff s majority and the suit having been brought more than three years from that day it is clearly barred by limitation. So holding, the learned Subordinate Judge finally dismissed the E. P. Aggrieved with the said decision of the learned Subordinate judge, the decree-holder preferred this appeal.
( 4 ) SRI Seetarama Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, contends that by 1. 6. 1956 when the limitation started against the decree-holder, the appellant was a minor and after the decree holder s death on 20. 11. 1956 the appellant who was the sole surviving heir of the deceased could not take any steps to execute the decree on account of his minority and he filed the E. P. within three years after attaining the majority and when there were no laches on his part in filing the execution petition, he is entitled to take the benefit of section 6 of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963. In support of his contention he relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in satyendra Naraih vs. Pitambara Singh (2) (AIR 1938 Pat. 92) and a decision of the Lahore High Court in Jlauhi bakshi vs Umar Bakshi (3) (AIR 1944 lah. 409.
( 5 ) IN the Patna case the decree was passed in favour of the minors on 6-8-1926. The guardian of the minors applied execution in 1931. But it was rejected as time barred and also for default on his part. One of the decree- holders attained majority in 1935. He along with the minors applied for execution. But the learned Sub Judge held it barred by res judicata, since it was rejected for default in 1931 when it was filed by the guardian of the minors and also barred by limitation. In revision it was contended that they were not bound by the acts of the guardian and they are entitled to file E. P. under Section 6 (1) of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 since one of (hem attained majority in 1935 itself. This contention was accepted by the learned judge and held that under section 6 (1) of the LIMITATION ACT, 1963 a minor is entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree within the statutory period of three years after attaining majority and the minor should not suffer for the laches of their guardian in the matter of making an application for execution.
( 6 ) THIS decision does not help the appellant s case. It does not lay down the principle that though the limitation had already begun to run against the decree -holder from the date of