Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : S.MADHUSUDAN RAO
Madala Narayanaswamy - Appellant
Versus
State OF A.P. - Respondent
Decided On : 11-28-75
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY - SECTION 120-B IPC - SECTION 121-A IPC - SECTION 120-B R/W SECTION 395 IPC - SECTION 120-B R/W SECTION 447 IPC - SECTION 122 IPC - SECTION 123 IPC - SECTION 124-A IPC - EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, SECTION 10 - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION - CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICES' EVIDENCE - REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING CONSPIRACY - ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENTS - FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION - ARTICLE 19(1)(A) AND 19(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION - OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY - ELEMENTS AND PROOF - DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICAL DISSENT AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY - PUNISHMENT FOR CONSPIRACY AND COMMITTED OFFENCES - CONFESSIONS AND THEIR EVIDENTIARY VALUE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING - ENHANCEMENT OF SENTENCES ON REVISION.
Fact of the Case:
Forty-seven accused were tried on seven charges related to conspiracy to commit various offenses, including murder, dacoity, and waging war against the Government of India. The charges were framed under Sections 120-B, 121-A, 122, 123, and 124-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The prosecution relied on the evidence of accomplices and various documents to establish the conspiracy and the involvement of the accused.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the evidence of the accomplices was tainted and could not be relied upon without independent corroboration. The court also held that Section 10 of the Evidence Act, 1872, which allows for the admission of statements and documents in cases of conspiracy, can only be invoked if there is reasonable ground to believe that a conspiracy exists. The court further observed that the accused's right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(A) of the Constitution is not an unbridled license to speak or express whatever one likes, and that reasonable restrictions can be imposed in the interests of public order and security.
Issues: 1. Whether the evidence of accomplices can be relied upon without independent corroboration? 2. Whether Section 10 of the Evidence Act, 1872, can be invoked without reasonable ground to believe that a conspiracy exists? 3. Whether the accused's right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(A) of the Constitution is absolute? 4. Whether the offense of conspiracy is complete upon agreement or requires the commission of the intended offense? 5. Whether confessions can be used as evidence against non-makers in a conspiracy case? 6. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing the accused?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the evidence of accomplices is tainted and cannot be relied upon without independent corroboration. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the rule of corroboration in cases of criminal conspiracy, as such offenses are easily manufactured. 2. The court held that Section 10 of the Evidence Act, 1872, can only be invoked if there is reasonable ground to believe that a conspiracy exists. The court stated that the operation of Section 10 is strictly conditional upon the existence of a reasonable belief in a conspiracy. 3. The court held that the accused's right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(A) of the Constitution is not absolute and can be reasonably restricted in the interests of public order and security. The court clarified that mere propagation of political views is permissible, but organizing unlawful activities such as dacoities and criminal trespasses is not protected by the right to freedom of speech. 4. The court held that the offense of conspiracy is complete upon agreement to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. The court stated that the agreement need not be entered into simultaneously by all parties and can develop over time. 5. The court held that confessions can be used as evidence against non-makers in a conspiracy case, but only for the purpose of lending assurance to other evidence against them. The court clarified that a retracted confession cannot be the sole basis for a conviction, even for the maker, unless corroborated by independent evidence. 6. The court held that the trial court did not err in sentencing the accused. The court considered the fact that the accused had been in judicial custody for a long time and that the sentences were substantial. The court also noted that the accused would be entitled to set off their pre-conviction detention against the sentences under the new Code of Criminal Procedure.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeals of the accused who were convicted and sentenced by the trial court. The court also dismissed the revision petition filed by the State seeking enhancement of the sentences. The court, however, acquitted three of the accused who were given the benefit of the doubt.
( 1 ) THESE ten appeals and the Criminal Revision case are directed against the same judgment of the learned additional Sessions Judge, Hyderadad in Sessions Cases Nos. 106/1970 and 6/1971. Forty seven accused were tried on seven charges. The first charge is under Sec. 120-B I P. C. on the ground that the accused conspired to commit murders, decoities, and other offences. The second charge also is under Sec. 120-B l. P. C. for conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India by collecting men, arms and ammunition. The third charge is one under Sec. 121-A l. P. C. for conspiracy to over are by means of criminal force and show of criminal force, the State Government. The fourth charge is under Sec. 121 j. P. C. for attempting and abetting to wage war against the Government of india. The fifth charge is under Sec. 122 l. P. C. for collecting men, arms and ammunition with the intention of waging War against the Government. The sixth charge is under Sec. 123 IPC. for holding secret meetings forming gorilla squads and adopting cover names and stealing weapons and thereby concealing the existence of a design to wage war against the Government of india. The seventh charge is for sedition, punishable under Sec. 124-A l. P. C on the ground that the accused attempted to bring into hatred and contempt, the Government established by law. Twenty four accused have been acquitted of all the charges. The remaining twenty three accused have been convicted of offences punishable under Secs. 121- a, 120-B r. vv. Sec 395, and 120-B r w. Sec. 447 l. P. C. and have been acquitted of all the other offences. Each of these twenty three accused has been sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for four years under each of the first two counts and rigorous imprisonment for three months under the third Count. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. The accused who were convicted are, A-1 to A 5 A-8, A-10 A-11, a-12, A-13, A-16, A-17, A-19, A-23, a 26, A-27, A-31, A-32, A-36, A-38, a-41 and A-47 and all these accused preferred the ten appeals against their convictions and sentences- The criminal Revision Case is filed by the State for enhancement of the sentences awarded to the appellants. [the learned Judge after narrating the facts considered the evidence and found that P. Ws. 3,5,6,7,9,12 to 19, 21 and 22 are accomplices and proceeded].
( 2 ) IT is a well-settled rule of practice and prudence not to act upon the evidence of accomplices except when it is corroborated in material particulars not only in regard to the corpus delicti but also in regard to particulars connecting the accused vvith the crime. An approver or an accomplice is admittedly immoral and infamous and the evidence of such a witness is held by the courts to be unworthy of credit and belief without independent corroboration inmarial particulars and qua each accused. The rule of independent corroborative evidence in regard to the offence and the offender should be more strictly followed in cases of criminal conspiracy to commit crimes or to over awe the Go- verment by the use of force as such offence of criminal conspiracy is established the moment an agreement to commit crimes or to over awe the Goverment by the use of force, is proved and evidence of a mere agreement amongst a witness and the persons charged can easily be manufactured. As well settled is the rule of corroboration of the evidence of approvers and accomplices, so well settled is the view that one accomplice cannoticorroborate another accomplice. Tainted evidence of an accomplice cannot be made taintless or better by being corroborated by the tainted evidence of another accopmlice. The corroborative evidence should be of an untainted kind, whether direct or circumstantial. Of course, it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material particular, spoken to by the approver or the accomplice. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme court in Haroonv
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