Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963 bars the institution of any suit for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 expired before the commencement of the new Act.

ALLADI KUPPUSWAMI, J.

( 1 ) THE first defendant in O. S. No. 81 of 1965 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judges Court Chittoor is the appellant. The plaintiff in the suit is a Mutt at Tirupathi represented by the present Matadhipathi. The suit was filed for a declaration that the permanent lease executed by the then Mathadhipathi on the 19th Chaitra of Vikari Corresponding to 1898 in favour of one, Govindachari and the subsequent alienation on 19-4-1940 in favour of C. V. Ramanujam, father of defendants 1 to 4 are void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff-mutt and for possession and mesne profits, past and future. According to the case of the plaintiff, the suit property belonged to the plaintiff mutt. One of the previous heads of the mutt executed a permanent lease in 1898 in favour of Govindachari. The grandson of the lessee sold the suit property in 1920 to one Ramaswamy Chatty who in turn sold (it) in 1927 to Katari Narasimhulu Reddv and another. Both of them sold (it) again to Pedda Subba Reddy in 1928. On 19-4-1940 the said Pedda Subba Reddy sold the property to the father of defendants 1 to 4. In a partition between the members of the defendants family it fell to the share of the first defendant. The plaintiff contended that the permanent lease constituted an alienation of the property and was not binding upon the mutt. The plaintiff therefore claimed a declaration that the lease was not binding and for recovery of possession of the property from the defendants.

( 2 ) THE Mathadhipathi who granted the lease in 1898 died on 13-9-1906. There were number of Mathadhipathis who succeeded one after another. The last of them died on 21-9-1960 and the plaintiff was appointed on 16-5-1960.

( 3 ) THE defendants contended that the lease was for necessity and was therefore binding on the mutt. They also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the permanent lease was supported by necessity end was binding on the mutt. It also held that the defendants had perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession. In the result It dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff-mutt preferred A. S. No. 508/70 to this court. Our learned brother, Venkatarama Sastry, J. , took the view that the suit was not barred by limitation. He also held that he could not agree with the finding of the lower court that, the permanent lease was supported by legal necessity. In the result, the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. A declaration was granted that the permanent lease Was not binding on the mutt and that the mutt was entitled to recover possession of the suit property, Jt. was directed that the mesne profits both past and future should be enquired into in a separate application.

( 4 ) THE first defendant has preferred this appeal against the judgment of Venkatarama Sastry, J.

( 5 ) SRI Ananta Babu, learned Counsel far the appellant contended that the suit is clearly barred by limitation This is the main question that has to be considered in this appeal.

( 6 ) UNDER Article 96 of the limitation Act a suit by the manager of a Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment to recover possession of moveable or immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for valuable consideration can be filed within twelve years from the date of death, resignation or removal of the transferor or the dale at appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment, whichever is later. It was contended by the learned Advocate-General that as the suit has been filed within twelve years from the date of appointment of the plaintiff as manager, namely, 16-5-1960 the suit is within time. This contention was accepted by Venkutarama Sastry, J. It was however, argued by Sri T. Ananta Babu, learned Counsel for the appellant that Section 31 of the Act provides that nothing in this Act shell enable any suit, appeal

Click Here to Read the rest of this document