The notification under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, can be attacked on grounds other than mala fides, arbitrary nature, or lack of jurisdiction or competence.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from the decision of Krishna Rao J. in Writ petition No. 1223 of 1966, whereby a writ of Certiorari was issued quashing the Notification made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh under Section 17 (4) of the LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894. Certain lands situated in the village of Nachupalli in Karimnagar District were sought to be acquired for providing House sites for Harijan families of the Village. By a Notification dated 11 -4-1u66, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh directed that in view of the urgency of the case the provisions of section 5-A of the LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 shall not apply to the acqussition of the arable lands specified in the notification.

( 2 ) IN the writ pitition the notification was challenged mainly on the ground that there was a colourable exercise of the power under section 17 (4) and that there was no urgency justifying the use of the power. Krishna Rao J. , held that no material was placed before the court by the Government to show under what circumstances the opinion about the urgency of the acquisition was formed. It was pointed out that the request for the acquisition was made as long ago as 1962 and that the Notification under section 17 (4) was made nearly four years later. He said:"as pointed out in the above rulings, the urgency must be such as would not brook a delay of 30 days for hearing the objections. In cases where there is delay on the part of the government in issuing the relevant notification, it will not be open to the Government to invoke the urgency clause as a matter of routine unless it is a case of real urgency as contemplated under the Act".

( 3 ) THE learned Judge held that the exercise of the power under section 17 (4) would be immune from review by courts only when the opinion is formed on the basis of the relevant factors but not otherwise. He thought that the proceedings of the District Social Welfare officer and his communication to the Revenue Divisional Officer to take action under the emergency clause did not constitute relevant material on which the Government could form its opinion about the urgency of the acquisition.

( 4 ) IN Writ Appeal Nc. 109 of 1969 the decision of Krishna Rao J, which is the subject-matter of the present appeal, came to be considered by a Division Bench of which I was a member. The Division bench expresed a view that was not wholly in accord with the pronouncement of Krishna Rao, J. The enunciation of the principle by the learned Judge was accepted in so far as he held that the statute makes it obligatory that either the Government or an officer of the secretariat authorised under the rules, should form an opinion to invoke the power under section 17 (4 ). The learned Judge s view was affirmed when he said that the opinion formed by the appropriate authority must be related to relevant data. To that extent, the division Bench expressed a view in consonance with the formulation of the principle by Krishna Rao. The Division Bench, however, struck a note at variance with what the learned Judge had stated in these terms :-"but when the learned Judge conceived of an examination hy the High Court of "the grounds upon which the said opinion is based " it is obvious that the Court, would, thereby be entrenching on a domain where the subjective satisfaction of the Government reigns supreme. To canvass the ground on which the decision is based and to scan the reasons underlying the subjective satisfaction of the Government is a function of a court of appeal and not of the High Court in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari. We find some difficulty in reconciling the wider role of the court envisaged in the examination of the "grounds" with what he himself described in the next sentence as "the limited purpose of finding out whether any opinion was at all arrived at by the authority. "

( 5 ) IF the range of justiciability is limited to ascertain whether in fact there was an opinion of the authority concerned, it is