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Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : A.GOPAL RAO, A.V.KRISHNA RAO, CHENNAKESAVA REDDY
Cherukuru Muthayya - Appellant
Versus
Gadde Gopalakrishnayya - Respondent
Decided On : 10-11-72
ESTATES ABOLITION ACT - SECTION 56(1)(C) - SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - DISPUTE AS TO WHO IS LAWFUL RYOT - CONNECTION WITH SECTIONS 55 AND 56 - TRANSITORY PROVISION - APPLICABILITY TO CASES WHERE DISPUTE ARISES AFTER ABOLITION OF ESTATE - DISTINCTION FROM SECTION 11 - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT TO TRY SUIT FOR INJUNCTION BY PERSON CLAIMING DISPOSSESSION OR NON-INTERFERENCE IN POSSESSION - EFFECT OF SECTION 3 OF THE ACT - RECOGNITION OF RYOT'S RIGHTS - GRANT OF PATTAS - RIGHT TO FILE SUIT FOR POSSESSION.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, who had managed the estate after the death of the owner and who had lost her husband when she was just a child, was also given half share in the partition. In the partition, two suit items fell to the share of the 2nd plaintiff. She executed a registered settlement deed in respect of the first item and executed a gift deed in regard to Item 2 in favour of the 1st plaintiff and put him in possession. The 2nd plainitiff had reserved life estate in the first item. She died during the pendency of the suit. On a contention that the defendants are trying to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs the suit for injuction was laid.
Finding of the Court:
1. Section 56(1)(c) of the Estates Abolition Act is not an independent or substantive provision unconnected with Section 56(1) or section 55 of the Act. No enquiry into the questions covered by Clause (c) therefore can be made if its purpose is not related to Section 56(1) and section 55 of the Act. 2. Section 56 is a transitory provision and applies only to cases where immediately after the abolition of an estate dispute arises between the land-holder and his ryots regarding the payment of any rent. 3. Clause (c) of Section 56(1) cannot be read in isolation and out of context with the other clauses of Section 56(1). Clause (c) if so read in the context of the two other clauses and keeping in view Section 55 of the Act can leave no one in doubt that the dispute under clause (c) would be required to be decided only in regard to the disputes covered by clauses (a) and (b). 4. Section 56(1)(c) has no relation whatsoever with Section 11 of the Act. They are independent and mutually exclusive provisions. They do not supplement each other. Their scope of operation and their effect are entirely different. 5. Section 3 of the Estates Abolition Act does not extinguish the rights of ryots in ryoti lands. The relationship of the ryot is extinguished. The relationship of the ryot as a pattader under Section II is established with the Government. The person i. e. the ryot who prima facie is entitled to patta cannot be dispossessed and since no right of his has been acquired by the Government he is not paid any compensation. He gets patta in pursuance of the realisation of the third object of the Act, that is to say, introduction of a ryotwari settlement. 6. A suit for possession by a landlord against a tenant is not barred by any provision of the Act provided no other provision comes in the way of such a suit.
Issues: 1. Whether an application under Section 56(1)(c) of the Estates Abolition Act can lie for getting a decision as to who the lawful ryot is, irrespective of the context in which clause (c) of that section appears? 2. Whether a suit for possession or injunction by a person who claims dispossession or non-interference in his possession can lie unless and until a patta is granted under the Estates Abolition Act?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 56(1)(c) of the Estates Abolition Act is closely related to the other clauses of Section 56(1) read with Section 55 of the Act. The purpose of an enquiry into a question covered by cl. (c) is intimately and integrally connected with Sections 55 and 56 only. 2. Section 56(1)(c) has no relevance whatever with section 11 of the Act. 3. Section 3 of the Estates Abolition Act does not extinguish the rights of ryots in ryoti lands. The relationship of the ryot is extinguished. The relationship of the ryot as a pattader under Section II is established with the Government. The person i. e. the ryot who prima facie is entitled to patta cannot be dispossessed and since no right of his has been acquired by the Government he is not paid any compensation. He gets patta in pursuance of the realisation of the third object of the Act, that is to say, introduction of a ryotwari settlement. 4. A suit for possession by a landlord against a tenant is not barred by any provision of the Act provided no other provision comes in the way of such a suit.
Final Decision: Petition and appeal allowed.
( 1 ) THIS appeal is from the judgment of the principal District Munsif orginally filed with the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada but transferred to the High Court to be heard along with W. P. No. 2057 of 1965.
( 2 ) ONE Guruvaiah had five sons and four daughters. The 2nd plaintiff is the eldest daughter. One of his sons Narasaiah died issuless. By 1942 there were four shareholders representing the branches of four sons. The contention was that the 1st plaintiffs father was illatom son-in-law of Guruvaiah. As such he was also given one share in the partition that took place in 1942. The 2nd plaintiff , who had managed the estate after the death of Guruvaiah and who had lost her husband when she was just a child, was also given half share in the partition.
( 3 ) IN the partition , two suit items fell to the share of the 2nd plaintiff. She executed a registered settlement deed on 19-9-1950 in respect of the first item and executed a gift deed in regard to Item 2 on 20-3-1952 in favour of the 1st plaintiff and put him in possession. The 2nd plainitiff had reserved life estate in the first item. She died during the pendency of the suit. On a contention that the defendants are trying to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs the suit for injuction was laid.
( 4 ) THE defence set up by the defendants was that in the partition properties were divided into four shares only among the four sons. No share was given to the 1st plainitiff or even to the 2nd plaintiff. They contended that they are in possession of the suit properties and that the settlement deed and gift deed are sham and bogus. The plaintiffs have no title. Nor are they in possession. They further alleged that since the 1st defendant filed an application under Section 56 (1) of the Estates Abolition Act, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial Court framed ten issues. The parties adduced oral evidence. They marked several documents. On an appreciation of this material, the principal District Munsif by his judgment dated 31-3-1965 held that the suit property had fallen to the share of the 2nd plaintiff in a family arrangement effected in 1942. She also had perfected her title over the suit property by adverse possession. It was also held that the settlement deed Exbit A-3 and gift deed Exbit A-4 were executed by the 2nd plaintiff in favour of the 1st plaintiff. It was found that there was no difference in boundries given in Ex- a-3 and those stated in the plaint regarding the first item of the suit property. The trial Court also held that the plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of the suit property since the time of partition and family settlement in 1942. The 1st plaintiff has acquired title to the suit properties.
( 5 ) IN spite of all these findings , the trial Court dismissed the suit in regard to Item No. 1 on the ground that the dispute between the parties in effect is as to who the lawful ryot is and although the suit is for injuction, it is not a claim beyond the purview of Section 56 of the Act. So the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred in view of the proceedings before the Settlement Officer. Since the proceedings under Section 56 related only to Item No. 1 , the suit was dismissed to that extent. In regard to Item No. 2 , however, it was decreed. No appeal is preferred by the defendants regarding Item No. 2. It has therefore become final. The plaintiffs have preferred the appeal in regard to Item 1 only.
( 6 ) AT this stage it is convenient to mention that the 1st defendant filed an application under Section 56 (1) (c) of the Estates Abolition Act, S. R. 66 (1) 48 of 1960. The Assistant Settlement Officer dismissed the application on 21-4-1960 on the ground that the dispute can be got settled by a Civil Court.
( 7 ) THE 1st defendant preferred Appeal T. A. S. No. 22 of 1960 to the Estates abolition Tribunal Krishna. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Assistant settlement Officer by its order dated 30-7-1
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