The Election Tribunal has jurisdiction to inquire into the age of a candidate in order to find out whether he was qualified to stand as a candidate on the date of nomination, and the entry in the electoral roll is not conclusive and can be challenged in an election petition if there is evidence to show that the person whose name is entered in the list did not have the requisite qualifications.

( 1 ) WARD No. 7 of Bodduvariapalem Panchayat is a constituency reserved for women. The election on 15-6-1970 resulted in the success of the petitioner by the narrowest of margins, i. e. , of a single vote. There was a third candidate but she withdraw leaving the filed clear for a straight contest between the petitioner and the first respondent of whom the petitioner is the sister of the 1st respondents husband. The petitioners mother ranged herself against her daughter and gave evidence in support of the daughter-in-laws case. Petitioners election was successfully challenged in a proceeding before the Tribunal on the ground that she had not attained the age of twenty one years and lacked the franchise which is the pre-requisite for seeking election.

( 2 ) BEFORE the Tribunal the respondent (the parties will be referred to according to their rank in the writ petition) relied on Ex. A-1, purporting to be an extract from the Register of births as also on the evidence of P. W. 1.

( 3 ) IN support of the writ petition Mr. Venkata Ramanareddy urged that the tribunals finding that the petitioner was less than 21 years of age at the material time is perverse or unsupported by evidence. Secondly he submitted that the entry in the register of voters is conclusive and in an election petition it is not competent for the tribunal to inquire into or adjudicate on the validity of the entry in the register.

( 4 ) THE argument on the first aspect is to this effect. Ex. A-1 is palpably unreliable. The report of the birth was given to the Village Munsiff two days after the child was born; but quite curiously the entry as to the birth mentions are name of the then two days old child. How could this name be entered when the mother (P. W. 1)in this case unequivocally admitted that none of her children was named before the expiry of twenty one days from the date of birth? The very admission of P. W. 1 is sufficient to discredit Ex. A-1 and shows that it is a wholly unreliable piece of evidence. It cannot be held that it relates to the petitioners even if in fact a birth occurred and the entry itself was not a wholesale fabrication. So argues the counsel.

( 5 ) THE reasoning looks plausible but on a thorough examination the conclusion must be that it is untenable. For a moment, let me assume that the mention in the register of the name of the child is a later interpolation. Even so, the entry in the register that a child was born to P. W. 1 must be upheld as a genuine one.

( 6 ) IT was made contemporaneously, that is to say, within the time normally taken for reporting the fact to the village officer. It is undeniable that a child was born as disclosed by the entry and on the date mentioned therein. The question does not relate to the petitioners birth? If there is another child to whose birth it relates, the fast could be conclusively established by evidence. There is no proof of that fact.

( 7 ) IN her evidence P. W. 1 stated that she gave birth to five sons and two daughters. The first daughter (the second born child) died on the 14th day after birth. There was thus only one surviving daughter the writ petitioner. The suggestion is that the birth extract relates to another daughter Anjamma born two years after the petitioner. But no evidence has been placed before the positive assertion of P. W. 1 on the contrary is that besides the petitioner there is no other daughter and she is 20 years old. There was thus sufficient evidence before the tribunal to justify the finding. It is difficult to perceive how the conclusion of the tribunal could be rejected as perverse or unsupported by evidence. The mention of the name of the child in Ex. A-1 may not have been cogently explained in the light of the admission of P. W. 1. that the child was christened only at the "barasala" on the 21st day. This does not militate against the positive testimony of P. w. 1 that the petitioner is the last born among her children and there is no other survi