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1970 Supreme(AP) 145
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : KODANDA RAMAYYA
Yegireddi Yerakamma - Appellant
Versus
Sub-Collector, Parvatipuram - Respondent
Decided On : 07-08-70
The right of appeal under section 3 (4) of the Act accrues from the date of communication of the decision of the Tahsildar under section 3 (3). The communication must be effective and actual to enable the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal.
Headnote:
INAMS (ABOLITION AND CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT - SECTION 3 (3) AND (4) - INTERPRETATION - COMMUNICATION OF DECISION - LIMITATION FOR APPEAL - STARTING POINT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, tenants in occupation of inam lands, challenged the order of the Special Deputy Tahsildar (Inams) declaring their lands as inam lands in a zeroyiti village. They argued that the order was not communicated to them and their appeal to the Revenue Court was within 60 days from the date of communication.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the right of appeal under section 3 (4) of the Act accrues from the date of communication of the decision of the Tahsildar under section 3 (3). The communication must be effective and actual to enable the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal. The mere publication of the decision in form II notice or the knowledge of the parties relating to the decision in some other way would not disentitle them from exercising their right of appeal.
Issues: 1. Whether the appeal preferred by the petitioners to the Revenue Court under section 3 (4) of the Act was within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision of the Tahsildar under section 3 (3)? 2. Whether the mere publication of the decision in form II notice or the knowledge of the parties relating to the decision in some other way would disentitle them from exercising their right of appeal?
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the provisions of section 3 (3) and (4) of the Act and held that the starting point for the purpose of limitation to prefer an appeal under sub-section (4) to section 3 is the date of communication to or receipt of the decision or order of the Tahsildar passed, under sub-section (3) by the concerned parties, but not the date of passing of the order. The court also held that the communication must be effective and actual to enable the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal.
Final Decision: The court quashed the order of the Sub-Collector and restored the appeal to his file with a direction to dispose of the same on merits after affording reasonable opportunity to all the parties concerned.
( 2 ) THE material facts may briefly be stated : The village of Polinaidu Valasa in Parvathipuram Taluk of Srikakulam district being hamlet of a zeroyili village, was held to be not an estate within the meaning of section 3 (2) (d) of the estates Land Act by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Srikakulam, in an enquiry under section 9 of the Estates Abolition act. That decision was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. In a suo motu enquiry by the Inams Tahsildar under section 3 of the Act, the lands in the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners have been declared as inam lands in zeroyiti village by the Inams Tahsildar by his order passed exparte in S. R. No. 108 of 1961, dated 25th December, 1961. It is averred in the affidavit that no notice relating to the enquiry was served on the petitioners, but the notices are alleged to have been served on persons who are not really tenants in occupation of the lands on the date of the enquiry, and the decision of the Tahsildar was never communicated to them or to any other tenant in that village as required by sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act. In the course of the eviction proceedings initiated by the inamdars against the petitioners, they came to know of the order made by the tahsildar on 25th December, 1961, declaring the lands in the village of Polinaidu valasa as inam lands in zeroyiti village. They have obtained a certified copy of the order and preferred an Appeal to the revenue Divisional Officer, Parvatipuram, which was dismissed as barred by limitation. Hence this writ petition.
( 3 ) SRI Ramamurthy, for the petitioners contends that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the short ground that the appeal preferred by his clients under section 3 (4) of the Act was well in time as the decision of the Special deputy Tahsildar (Inams), Bobbili, in s. R. No. 108 of 1961, dated 25th December, 1961, was not communicated to them until they applied for and obtained a certified copy of that decision. This claim of the petitioners is opposed by the respondents contending inter alia that the decision of the Special Deputy tahsildar was in fact communicated to the petitioners.
( 4 ) THE question therefore, that arises for decision is whether the appeal preferred by the petitioners to the Revenue court under section 3 (4) of the Act against the decision of the Special Deputy tahsildar, dated 25th Pecember, 1961. under section 3 (3) is in time as contended by the petitioners, or barred by limitation as urged by the respondents.
( 5 ) FOR a proper appreciation of the respective contentions of the Counsel, it is necessary and relevant to examine the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 3 of the Act which read thus :-"3- (3) The Tahsildar shall thereafter give the persons or institutions concerned a reasonable opportunity of adducing any evidence in support of their cases and may also examine any relevant document in the possession of the Government and give his decision in writing in regard to items (i), (ii) and (iii) in sub-section (1) and communicate the decision to the persons or institutions concerned. (4) Any person or institution aggrieved by a decision of the Tahsildar under sub-section (3), may appeal to the Revenue court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision and the Revenue Court may after giving the parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on the appeal as it thinks fit. "under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the act, the Tahsildar has to give the concerned persons or institutions reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence oral and documentary, in support of their respective cases. He may also examine any relevant and ma
