Mere delay in the performance of a contract is not a ground for refusing specific performance, unless the delay is accompanied by such conduct on the part of the plaintiff as has caused prejudice to the defendant.

( 1 ) BY an agreement dated 11-9-1963 the defendant agreed to convey to the plaintiff Ac. 10-30 guntas of land situated in the village of Madnoor, for a consideration of Rs. 10,500. 00 On the date of the agreement the vendor received a sum of Rs. 5,500. 00. It provided that the balance of the purchase-money was payable in five instalments. A sum of Rs, 3,000/- was payable on or before the 31/01/1964 and the balance of Rs. 2,000. 00 was to be paid in four equal instalment by the Telugu New Years day in each of the years from 1965 to 1968, both inclusive. The agreement recites that the vendee has agreed that in case of the default he shall have no rights to the land. It further provided that after the payment of the 1st instalment the Vendor was to execute a deed of sale if called upon to do so.

( 2 ) THE amount of Rs. 3,000. 00 payable before the expiry of January, 1964 was not paid within the time specified. But it is common ground that on the 19th March and 30/09/1964 the Vendor received Rs. 950. 00 and Rs. 550. 00 respectively. The acceptance of these two payments is clear indication that the vendor waived the time-limit prescribed by the agreement in respect of the first instalment.

( 3 ) THERE was an exchange of notice between the parties in 1965. On 6-10-1965 the vendor issued a notice complaining about the non-performance of the obligation by the vendee and calling upon him to surrender possession of the property. It may be mentioned that the vendee was cultivating the lands even before the date of the agreement. By the above mentioned notice. Ex. B-1 the vendor notified to the other party that the agreement stood cancelled and therefore he was entitled to the restorations of the possession. To this, a reply was sent on 8-11-1965 as per Ex. B-2. The vendee said that he was allowed an extension of time for the payment of the instalments and therefore the vendor could not complain about the delay. The vendee took the stand that an application under Section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1950 was bound to be made by the seller. The reply notice accordingly called upon the vendor to fulfill the obligations of securing the permission prescribed by the statute. The vendee expressed his read lines and willingness to pay the amounts that accrued due as per the installment, provided the vendor started proceedings under Section 47. It was asserted in Ex. B-2 that the vendor who was no other than the cousin of the who was no other than the cousin of the vendee had agreed to accommodate the purchaser by granting extension of time. Ex B-2 evoked a rejoinder under Ex. B-3 dated 19-11-1965. The vendor reiterated his case about the default by the purchaser and maintained that the construct elapsed and was no longer subsisting.

( 4 ) THE suit was thereupon instituted by the appellant for the enforcement of the contract. The respondent pleaded that time was the essence of the contract and that the non-payment of the amount that accrued due under two installment justifies the cancellation of the agreement.

( 5 ) THE lower Court dismissed the suit on two grounds. In the first place for specific performance was maintainable by reason of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The trial Judge was of opinion that the agreement did not make it obligatory on the vendor to obtain the requisite sanction under the aforementioned Act. The second ground on which the plaintiff was non suited was that there was undue delay on the part of the plaintiff in the performance of his notwithstanding the courts opinion that time was not the essence of the agreement and that the vendor had in fact granted an extension of time for making payments under the first instalment.

( 6 ) IN this appeal by the plaintiff, it is submitted at the outset that, the view taken by the lower court that a suit for specific performance is unenforceable is no longer valid in view of the pronouncement of