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1969 Supreme(AP) 184

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : A.GOPAL RAO, GOPALRAO EKBOLE, N.KUMARAYYA, O.CHINNAPPA REDDY
Pithana Apprao - Appellant
Versus
State OF A.P. - Respondent
Decided On : 12-31-69

The classification of slum areas for the purpose of improvement was reasonable and founded on necessity. The Act applied uniformly to all members who were the owners of lands and buildings occupied by persons living in unhygienic conditions. The impugned Act did not confer unregulated discretion on the Government to acquire land under the general law or under the Act.

Headnote:

SLUM IMPROVEMENT ACT - CONSTITUTIONALITY - CLASSIFICATION - UNREASONABLE DISCRIMINATION - UNCONTROLLED DISCRETION - COMPENSATION - ADEQUACY - SCHEDULE CLAUSE 2 (2) - INVALIDITY - SEVERABILITY - NOTICES - NATURAL JUSTICE - SECTION 15 - APPLICATION TO PENDING CASES - NOTICE TO PARTIES - NECESSITY.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1956 (the Act) and the notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act. The main contention was that the Act was violative of Articles 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the Act was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The classification of slum areas for the purpose of improvement was reasonable and founded on necessity. The Act applied uniformly to all members who were the owners of lands and buildings occupied by persons living in unhygienic conditions. The impugned Act did not confer unregulated discretion on the Government to acquire land under the general law or under the Act. The Court also held that Clause 2(2) of the Schedule to the Act, which provided for a deemed number of huts for the purpose of determining the gross rent, was invalid as it was arbitrary and conferred unguided power on the Government. However, the Court held that this provision was severable and did not affect the validity of the other provisions of the Act. The Court further held that Section 6 of the Act, which provided for the basis of determination of compensation, was not violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The Act specified the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation was to be determined and given. The compensation determined on such principles could not be said to be illusory. The Court also held that Section 15 of the Act, which applied the Act to certain pending cases of acquisition, required that a notice be given to the parties in the pending cases before the Government directed that the provisions of the Act be applied to their case.

Issues: 1. Whether the Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the Act conferred unregulated discretion on the Government to acquire land? 3. Whether Clause 2(2) of the Schedule to the Act was invalid? 4. Whether Section 6 of the Act was violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution? 5. Whether Section 15 of the Act required a notice to be given to the parties in the pending cases before the Government directed that the provisions of the Act be applied to their case?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The classification of slum areas for the purpose of improvement was reasonable and founded on necessity. The Act applied uniformly to all members who were the owners of lands and buildings occupied by persons living in unhygienic conditions. The impugned Act did not confer unregulated discretion on the Government to acquire land under the general law or under the Act. 2. Clause 2(2) of the Schedule to the Act, which provided for a deemed number of huts for the purpose of determining the gross rent, was invalid as it was arbitrary and conferred unguided power on the Government. 3. Section 6 of the Act, which provided for the basis of determination of compensation, was not violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The Act specified the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation was to be determined and given. The compensation determined on such principles could not be said to be illusory. 4. Section 15 of the Act, which applied the Act to certain pending cases of acquisition, required that a notice be given to the parties in the pending cases before the Government directed that the provisions of the Act be applied to their case.

Final Decision: The Court allowed Writ Petition No. 1771 of 1966 and quashed the impugned notification under Section 3(2) of the Act. The petitioners were awarded costs.

GOPAL RAO EKBOTE, J.

( 1 ) THESE petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India question the validity of the notifications issued under S. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act. 1956, hereinafter called "the Act". The main attack in all these petitions is on the validity of the Act itself under which the impugned notifications were issued. These petitions raise common questions of law. They can therefore conveniently be disposed of by a common judgment.

( 2 ) A Bench of this Court thought that important questions involving far-reaching consequences both to the State as well as to the citizens are involved in the petitions which challenge the constitutional validity of the Act and has referred these cases to a Full Bench. That is how the matter has come before us. The attack on the validity of the Act is twofold; (1) under Article 14 and (2) under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.

( 3 ) THE first contention of the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners is that the Act is offensive of Article 14 inasmuch as it gives different treatment to the lands situated in the slum area and the lands situated outside such area without any reasonable basis for such discrimination. The classification, it is argued is unreasonable and has very little nexus with the object it seeks to achieve.

( 4 ) IT is not in doubt that the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 is a general law on the topic of acquisition for public purpose. The law is general because its provisions embrace the whole subject of acquisition of immovable property, the object of such acquisition being for public purpose. It is applicable to the whole of India.

( 5 ) ON the other hand, the impugned Act is a special Act. Its object is to acquire land for the purpose of slum improvement which purpose although a public purpose is given a special treatment in the Act. From the point of view of object, therefore, it is special in its nature. The subject-matter of the Act also deals with acquisition of land situated only in slum areas. Thus from both the points of view of subject matter as well as object, the Act is a special Act.

( 6 ) THE question which falls for out determination therefore is whether the impugned Act is ultra vires of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The contention was that under the general law of acquisition when land in slum areas also can be acquried for the purpose of improving the slums, by enacting the impugned Act which provides comparatively a lesser compensation and deprives the land owners of solatium it gives a discrimination treatment to the land owners of the slum area and land owners outside it. It was also contended that the Act leaves an uncontrolled and unregulated discretion with the Government to acquire lands either under the general law of acquisition or under the impugned Act. It is therefore violative of Article 14.

( 7 ) IT is now not in dispute that when an Act is assailed as class or special legislation, the attack is usually based on the claim that there are persons or things similarly situated to those embraced in the Act, and which by the terms of the Act are excluded from its operation. the present contention also is based on such a claim.

( 8 ) THE question then is whether the persons or things embraced by the impugned Act form by themselves a proper and legitimate class with reference to the object and purpose of the Act. Constitution forbids class legislation. But, it does not forbid a reasonable and proper classification of the object of legislation. There is no prohibition in the Constitution to enact a special law in a case where the general law of the same subject exists. Although thus the Land Acquisition Act is a general Act, its existence does not forbid the State Legislature from enacting a special legislation operating within a restricted field. There is, however, a restriction that such a law should not be discriminatory so as to attract the wrath of Article 14. Article 14 provides













































































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