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1967 Supreme(AP) 133

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : O.CHINNAPPA REDDY, P.JAGMOHAN REDDY
Kuppu Damayanthi - Appellant
Versus
C.Rama Rao - Respondent
Decided On : 09-27-67

The Court has discretion to consider the question of delay in instituting a proceeding for a declaration of nullity of marriage under Section 34(1)(e) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and such delay may disentitle the petitioner to the decree.

Headnote:

SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT - NULLITY OF MARRIAGE - DELAY IN FILING PETITION - SECTION 34(1)(E) - INTERPRETATION - VESTED RIGHTS - SECTION 51(3) - EFFECT.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant (wife) and the respondent (husband) were married under the Special Marriage Act, 1872. The marriage was not a success, and the respondent filed a petition for a declaration that the marriage was null and void under Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, alleging that he was below the age of twenty-one years on the date of marriage and that the consent of his father had not been obtained as required by Section 2(3) of the Special Marriage Act, 1872.

Finding of the Court:

The District Judge granted the declaration, but on appeal, the High Court set aside the decree and remanded the petition for fresh disposal, holding that the District Judge had not considered the question of delay in instituting the proceeding under Section 34(1)(e) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. On remand, the District Judge again granted the declaration, holding that there was no unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding.

Issues: 1. Whether there was unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding under Section 34(1)(e) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954? 2. Whether Section 34(1)(e) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, abridges or curtails any right to a remedy which the respondent possessed under the Act of 1872? 3. Whether Section 51(3) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, preserves the right of remedy which a party had under the old Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that there was unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding, considering that the respondent had waited for seven years after the alleged break in the marriage to file the petition, and that his explanation for the delay, that he was trying to secure a divorce peacefully, was not satisfactory. 2. The Court held that Section 34(1)(e) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, does not abridge or curtail any right to a remedy which the respondent possessed under the Act of 1872, as it merely vests discretion in the Court to consider the question of delay with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. 3. The Court held that Section 51(3) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, preserves vested rights, such as the validity of marriages solemnized under the Act of 1872, but it does not preserve rights of action which the parties had under the old Act, as the Act of 1954 has made provision for identical remedies.

Final Decision: The Court reversed the finding of the Lower Court and held that there had been unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding disentitling the respondent to the decree of nullity of marriage. The decree of the Lower Court was set aside and the appeal was allowed with costs.

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THE appellant (wife) and the respondent (husband) were married under the Special Marriage Act, 1872, on 24-2-1953. before the Registrar of Marriages at Visakhapatnam. They appear to have lived together as man and wife for some time prior to the marriage too. and the appellant had admittedly borne the respondent a son before the marriage. The marriage did not meet with the approval of the parents of the respondent. His father never got reconciled to the marriage and made persistent efforts to get the marriage dissolved by trying to induce the appellant to agree to a divorce but his efforts bore no fruit. Whether it was due to the strenuous efforts of the respondents father to separate husband and wife or due to the alleged waywardness of the parties the marriage itself was not a great success. The appellant and respondent do not appear to have lived together continuously for any considerable length of time at any stage but they undoubtedly lived together off and on at various places periodically. Though the marriage was not a success. the respondent even as late as in February 1958, appeared to have been quite keen that the appellant should come and live with him and that she should resist attempts by his father to induce her to agree to a divorce. This is evident from Ex. B. 11 (d) letter written by him to the appellant. Some time between the year 1958 and 1960 there was a definite break between the parties. After the break renewed and redoubled efforts were made by the respondents father to induce the appellant to agree to a divorce but again without any result. Finally on 12-6-1960 the respondent filed the petition giving rise to this appeal. under Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act of 1954 for a declaration that the marriage was null and void. He alleged and it is now undisputed. that he was born on 5-10-1932 and therefore below the age of twenty one years on the date of marriage i. e. 24-2-1953. AS the consent of his father had not been obtained as required by Section 2 (3) of the Special Marriage Act , 1872. he claimed that the marriage was a nullity. The learned District Judge of Visakhapatnam granted the declaration prayed for but on appeal Chandra Reddy. C. J. and Gopal Rao Ekbote, J. , set aside the decree and remanded the petition for fresh disposal as they were of the view that the learned District Judge had not considered the question whether there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding Under Section 34 (1) (e) of the Special Marriage Act. 1954. it is only where the Court is satisfied that there has been no unnecessary or improper delay that relief under Section 24 could be granted but not otherwise. After remand the learned District Judge holding that there was no unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding, once more granted the declaration prayed for. The wife has now appealed against the decree of the learned District Judge.

( 2 ) THE Marriage, as we said, was solemnised on 24-2-1953 and the petition for a declaration that the marriage was null and void was filed on 12-6-1960. The explanation offered by the respondent for this long delay, which has been accepted by the learned District Judge is that almost from the date of marriage, he or those interested in him were trying to secure a divorce peacefully and that he was compelled to file the petition under Section 24 only after those efforts proved fruitless. But, in our opinion, this is no explanation at all. On the contrary, it implies a recognition by the parties of the existence and validity of the marriage which is not valid. We cannot help that the failure of a spouse to induce the other spouse to agree to a divorce is explanatory of the delay in suing for a declaration that a marriage is null and void. It may be said, as indeed it was said by the learned Counsel social conditions require that there should be no rigid insistence on the maintenance of a union which has utte














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