A Receiver appointed in a suit for dissolution of partnership is not a necessary party to a suit for recovery of money from the partners of the dissolved firm, and leave of the Court appointing the Receiver is not necessary for instituting such a suit.

GOPAL RAO EKBOTE, J.

( 1 ) THE defendants have preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Kavali confirming substantially the judgment of the trial Court. The respondent (plaintiff) filed the present suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 675-9-0 as amount due from the firm of C. Satyanarayana and K. Kotilingam Setty and Company, and its partners It was contended that the 3rd defendant borrowed an amount of Rs. 500 on 25-2-1953 from the plaintiff at Janardanapuram of Kandukur Taluk. Since the amount has not been paid, the suit was laid. Defendants 1, 2, 4 and 5 contended that the 3rd defendant did not borrow any money, and they also pleaded in the alternative that even if the 3rd defendant had borrowed any money, the firm is not liable to pay that amount, nor the other partners are liable.

( 2 ) 3rd defendant in his written statement denied that he ever borrowed Rs. 500 from the respondent. He contended that on that day, i. e. on 25-2-1953 he was not at Janardanapuram, but he was at Madras and that no such transaction took place, He contended alternatively that the transaction took place at Madras and it is the Madras City Civil Court that has got the Jurisdiction, and opt the District Munsiff of Kanigiri. He further pleaded that a Receiver is appointed in a suit Wed for dissolution of the defendants firm, and unless the Receiver is made a party and the permission of the Court is obtained, the present suit is not maintainable.

( 3 ) UPON these pleadings, the learned District Munsiff framed appropriate issues. After recording the evidence adduced by the parties, he held that the suit debt is true. He also found that the suit is maintainable, since in his view, neither the Receiver was a necessary or proper party, nor the permission of the Court was required at the stage of the filing of the suit. Consequently, he decreed the plaintiff s suit.

( 4 ) THE defendants preferred an appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge, Kavali. The learned Subordinate fudge modified the decree of the trial Court by deleting the extra one pie interest that the plaintiff had charged. In other respects, he confirmed the decree of the trial Court negativing all the contentions raised by the appellants therein.

( 5 ) IN this second appeal, the view of the learned Subordinate Judge is now assailed.

( 6 ) TWO contentions were raised before me by Mr. V. P. Raju. It was firstly contended that the District Munsiff, Kanigiri had no jurisdiction to try the suit. This contention was based on Ex. A-3. Ex. A-3 is a letter written from Madras on 25-2-1953 and is signed by C. S. Chetty for C and K. L. and Co. This letter is on the letter-head of the said company which is a firm. On the top of the letter Subject to Madras jurisdiction is printed. It is on this letter that it is contended that even in regard to the present transaction, it is the City Civil Court, Madras which has got jurisdiction, and not the District Munsiff at Kanigiri.

( 7 ) BOTH the Courts below have negatived this contention On appreciation of evidence, it was found by the learned Subordinate Judge that the transaction took place at Janardanapuram, and not at Madras as was alleged by the 3rd defendant. It was also found that the letter, Ex. A-3 was written subsequently and "subject to Madras jurisdiction" was not one of the terms of the contract in regard to the transaction which took place at Janardanapuram. In view of this finding of fact, I do not think, any question of jurisdiction arises in this case.

( 8 ) THE learned counsel or the appellants relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Libra Mining Works v. Baldota Brothers. Importers and Exporters, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 4-52. Far from supporting the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants, that decision distinctly goes against his contention. In that ease, the term in regard to the jurisdiction was a part of the contract. The term did not appear as it appeared in this case at the top of the let

Click Here to Read the rest of this document