Awards passed under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1952, are orders within the meaning of Section 8 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and appeals against such awards are subject to ad valorem court fees under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Act.

MANOHAR PERSHAD, J.

( 1 ) IN these three appeals (C. M. As. 314/1962 and 63 and 64 of 1963) which have been preferred under Section 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, XXX of 1952, against the award of the Court of the Arbitrator (District Judge), East Godavary, the appellants valued the appeals at Rs. 21,871. 00. Rs. 576. 00 and Rs. 1056. 00 respectively and paid Court-fee under Article 11 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act of 1870 (as amended) treating the appeals as appeals against orders. The office raised an objection that the appellants have to pay ad valorem Court-fee under Schedule 1, Article 1 on the amounts of Rs. 21,871. 00 -. Rs. 576. 00 and Rs. 1056. 00 respectively after deducting the court-fee already paid.

( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants. Shri P. Suryanarayana and Shri M. Suryanarayana murthy, contend that the office note cannot be accepted and that the court-fee paid is proper. As this matter related to the payment of Court-fee, notice was given to the Government Pleader.

( 3 ) THE point that arises for determination is whether the appellants should pay ad valorem Court-fee on the additional amount claimed by the appellants or whether they are liable to pay only fixed Court-fee under Article 11, Sch. II of the court-fees Act. The learned counsel for the appellants relying on the case of Dodhla Malliah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 216; Kanwar Jagat v. Punjab State, AIR 1957 Pandh 32; Debi Din v. Secy. of State, AIR 1939 All 127 and Hirji Virji v. Govt. of Bombay, AIR 1945 Bom 348, contended that the Court-fee payable would only be as provided under Article 11 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act, whereas the contention of Shri Shankar Rao, learned Government Pleader, is that the Court-fee payable would be under Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court-tees Act. In this connection the learned Government Pleader has relied on the cases of In re: Ananda Lal, AIR 1932 Cal 346 and Satya Charan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 Cal 609.

( 4 ) IN order to appreciate the respective contentions we have to refer to Section 8 of the Court-fees Act of 1870 (as amended ). It reads:"the amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the differences between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. "the question, that arises is what meaning has to be given to the word order occurring in this section. It is common ground that the word order has not been defined in the Court-fees Act of 1870. The contention of Shri Suryanarayana and Shri Suryanarana Murthy is that since the Act has not defined the word order, it has to be understood as defined in Section 2 (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which says "order means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. " It is very difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel. It is no doubt true that the word order has not been defined in the Court-fees Act and it is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree, still it would be an order that would come within the scope of Section 8 of the Court-fees Act. An identical question had come up in the case AIR 1932 Cal 346, Rankin, C. J. , while dealing with the scope of Section 8 of the Court-fees Act observed as follows:"section 8 dealing with the amount of fees payable makes a comparison between the two things: the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. It appears to be reasonably clear that the comparison can only be between the amount awarded to the appellant and the amount claimed by the appellant. There can be no comparison between the amount awarded to a number of per sons and the amount claimed by one individual representing his individual interest. Where the appellants have been given nothing by way of co

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