Back
1965 Supreme(AP) 2
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : BASI REDDI, GOPALRAO EKBOLE
CHINTAPALLI ACHAIAH - Appellant
Versus
P.Gopalakrishna Reddy - Respondent
Decided On : 01-05-65
A classification of persons or things is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution if it is based on a reasonable and rational basis and has a nexus with the object of the legislation.
Headnote:
ANDHRA PRADESH BUILDINGS (LEASE, RENT AND EVICTION) CONTROL ACT - S. 32 (B) - VALIDITY - CLASSIFICATION OF BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTED BEFORE AND AFTER 26TH AUGUST, 1957 - WHETHER VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 - HELD, NO.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner filed a suit for a declaration that he is a tenant within the meaning of section 2 (ix) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (XV of 1960) (hereinafter called the Act) and, therefore is entitled to the protection afforded thereunder. The respondent who is the landlord instituted a suit against the petitioner before the same Court for possession of the suit property contending that as the suit building was constructed in 1960 it is exempted from the operation of the Act. The Chief Judge framed the following common issue in both the suits: "whether section 32 (b) of the Act is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative in view of the provisions of Article 14 and Article 19 of the constitution of India?"
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that section 32 (b) of the Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The classification of buildings constructed before and after 26th August, 1957 is reasonable and has a rational nexus with the object of the Act, which is to regulate the leasing of buildings, control the rent thereof, and prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom.
Issues: Whether section 32 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (XV of 1960) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the classification of buildings constructed before and after 26th August, 1957 is reasonable and has a rational nexus with the object of the Act, which is to regulate the leasing of buildings, control the rent thereof, and prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom. 2. The Court also held that the date of 26th August, 1957 was chosen as the cut-off date because it was the date on which a notification was issued under the previous Act exempting buildings constructed after that date from the operation of the Act. This date was continued in the present Act in order to avoid any retrospective effect in Telangana area, where the previous Act was already in force.
Final Decision: The Court held that section 32 (b) of the Act is valid and good and it does not offend in any manner article 14 of the Constitution.
( 1 ) THE question which must essentially be answered in this enquiry is whether S. 32 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (XV of 1960) (hereinafter called the Act) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The material facts are that the petitioner instituted a suit, O. S. No. 19 of 1963 in the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for a declaration that he is the tenant within the meaning of section 2 (ix) of the Act and, therefore is entitled to the protection afforded thereunder. The respondent who is the landlord instituted O. S. No. 20 of 1963 against the petitioner before the same Court for possession of the suit property contending that as the suit building was constructed in 1960 it is exempted from the operation of the Act, The Chief Judge framed the following common issue in both the suits:"whether section 32 (b) of the Act is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative in view of the provisions of Article 14 and Article 19 of the constitution of India?"the petitioner submitted an application, I. A. No. 91 of 1964 under section " 113 read with Order 46, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, to refer the question involved in the said issue for determination to the High Court. The learned Chief Judge through his order dated 8th April, 1964 rejected the petition. Against the said order C. R. P. No. 1679 of 1964 is filed. C. M. P. No. 4906 of 1964 is filed by the petitioner under Article 228 of the Constitution requesting this Court to withdraw the two suits in order to determine the issue mentioned above. It was conceded that in order to resolve the constitutionality of section 32 (b) it is necessary to assume that the building in question was constructed after 26th August, 1957 and it is on that basis that the learned Advocate for the petitioner argued before us. Section 32 (b) is in the following terms: "32. The provisions of this Act shall not apply (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) to any building constructed on or alter the 26th August, 1957 . Now Article 14 has been construed in several cases by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The difficulty therefore is not about the ascertainment of the principles enunciated in those cases The real difficulty arises in applying those principles to the cases arising now and then. In substance the principle underlying Article 14 is that it does not prohibit the Legislature from classifying persons or things, or from setting up different classes to some of which the law may apply, while to others it may not. But in order that such a classification may be constitutionally valid, it must be based on some rational basis. It must be intelligible classification. It is also necessary that the basis of such a classification must have some rational nexus with the object which the legislation is intended to achieve. Before we test section 32 (b) in the light of the abovesaid twin principles underlying Article 14 of the Constitution, it is better to keep in view some of the presumptions which arise in such cases. It need hardly be asserted that every presumption favours the validity of an act of the Legislature and the doubts, if any, must be resolved in support of the Act. Similarly, it must be presumed that the Legislature acted with an honest purpose to keep the enactment within the constitutional limits. This presumption arises from the fact that the Legislature is pledged to support and uphold the Constitution. It is also presumed that the Legislature intended that the whole of the Act and every part of it should be significant and effective. It is obvious that these presumptions are not conclusive. Nevertheless they throw burden upon the person who attacks the validity to show clearly and convincingly how and in what respect the impugned provision or the Act is violative of any constitutional principle, mr. T, Lakshmiah, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, challenged the validity of section 32
