A widow's right to maintenance under the general Hindu Law was not taken away by the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 (XVIII of 1937) and that the option would rest with her to claim maintenance or a share, but not both.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under the Letters Patent against the Judgment of Kumarayya, J. in A. S. No. 39 of 1959, by which the learned Judge decreed the plaintiff s suit for partition of items 1 to 8 of plaint a schedule lands in modification of the lower Court s decree and confirmed the decree of the lower Court for the partition of the entire plaint b schedule properties (house properties) and items 1 to 7 of plaint c schedule properties (movables ). Defendants 1 to 3 are the present appellants, defendants 2 and 3 being the sons of the first defendant. The suit was brought by the widow of the first defendant s brother, Kanteti Satyanarayana, who died on 14th December, 1947 leaving him surviving his widow, the plaintiff.

( 2 ) THE main defences to the suit were : firstly, that the plaintiff had given up her claim to a share in the family properties and elected to receive only maintenance under a family settlement dated 4th November, 1948 and as such it is not now open to her to claim a share ; and secondly, that items i and 4 to 8 of plaint a Schedule are barber s service inam lands which could not be partitioned. Our learned brother rejected both these defences and decreed the plaintiff s suit. It is now contended before us that there defences should be upheld. To appreciate the said contentions, the relevant facts require to be noticed. After the death of her husband, the plaintiff set up an unregistered will as having been executed by her husband bequeathing his properties to her and authorising her to adopt to him a boy of her choice. The plaintiff presented the same for registration to the Sub-Registrar, Kothapeta. The Sub-Registrar refused to register the will. Thereupon she preferred an appeal to the District Registrar. During the pendency of that appeal, some mediators brought about an agreement between the parties whereunder she gave up her case that her husband died divided and testate and agreed to receive from out of the family income 12 bags of paddy and rs. 65 per year for her maintenance and reside in a part of the family house. Consequent on filing this agreement, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The compromise memo, filed before the District Registrar is relied on as a family settlement by which it is contended that the widow had elected her remedy to receive maintenance and thereby given up her claim to a share in the family properties.

( 3 ) OUR learned brother rejected the said document as inadmissible being unregistered document. In his view the oral evidence adduced in this behalf was untrustworthy. The pertinent observations of our learned brother are these :"if the compromise petition evidences her relinquishment that being a document affecting immovable property, under the provisions of section 17 of the Registration Act, ought to have been registered and being unregistered it is inadmissible in evidence to prove any agreement affecting immovable property. Besides, the evidence of D. Ws. 1 and 2, apart from being replete with glaring discrepancies, does not appeal to reason. The lower Court wa right when it said that D. Ws. 1 and 2 cannot be believed at all. In such state of evidence, it cannot be said that the widow had renounced her right of partition. Her acceptance of maintenance, as already observed, would not per se deprive her right to claim partition, which is a standing right and enures for her benefit during her lifetime. "

( 4 ) IT is manifest therefore that the document would be inadmissible if it operates, as a relinquishment of the widow s right to a share in the family properties. Obviously, to get over this difficulty the learned Counsel would have us read the document as a mere narration of the terms of an oral family arrangement between the parties earlier and that the document by itself does not purport to declare, create, or assign any right, title or interest in immovable property (vide ground No. 10 in the memorandum of appeal ). We do not consider that