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1963 Supreme(AP) 120

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : GOPALA KRISHNAN NAIR
Andhra Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society - Appellant
Versus
State OF A.P. - Respondent
Decided On : 07-30-63

An order of dismissal for default by a Labour Court does not constitute an award within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, as it does not involve any adjudication of the dispute and does not resolve the differences between the parties.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - AWARD - DEFINITION - ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR DEFAULT - NOT AN AWARD - FRESH REFERENCE COMPETENT.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, an employer, sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the Labour Court from taking proceedings in pursuance of a reference made by the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The main ground was that the Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference when two valid awards made by the same Labour Court in previous references were in operation.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the orders passed by the Labour Court in the previous references, which were orders of dismissal for default of appearance of the workmen, did not constitute awards within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, Sections 17 to 19 did not apply to them and the Government was not precluded from making the impugned reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act.

Issues: Whether the orders passed by the Labour Court in the previous references constituted awards within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the definition of "award" in Section 2(b) of the Act and held that it requires an industrial dispute or any question relating thereto to be determined by a Labour Court. The court found that the orders of dismissal for default did not involve any adjudication of the dispute and did not resolve the differences between the parties. Therefore, they were not awards within the meaning of the Act.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition and upheld the impugned reference made by the Government.

GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner who is an employer seeks a writ of Prohibition to restrain the Labour Court, Guntur, from taking proceedings in pursuance of the reference dated 2-12-1961 made by the State Government under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred as the Act ).

( 2 ) THE main ground on which this Writ Petition is rested is that the Government had no jurisdiction to make the impugned order of reference at a time when two valid awards made by the same Labour Court in I. D. No. 33 of 1960 and I. D. No. 23 of 1961 on previous references by the Government under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act, were in operation. The two prior awards were published by the Government in the official gazette on 12-10-1961. Under Section 19 (3) of the Act those awards would remain in operation till 11-11-1962. Even thereafter they would continue to bind the parties unless and until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by one of the affected parties intimating his intention to bring them to an end. This is the provision in Section 19 (6 ). In view of these statutory provisions, the petitioner claims that the impugned reference made by the Government on 2-12-1961, i. e. , in less than two months from the date of the publication of the previous awards in the official gazette, is without jurisdiction and in excess of the authority of the Government.

( 3 ) THE respondents resist this petition mainly on the ground that the orders passed by the Labour Court in I. D. No. 33 of 1960 and I. D. No. 23 of 1961, did not constitute awards within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, Sections 17 to 19 did not apply to them and consequently there was nothing in the Act to preclude the Government from making the impugned reference under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act.

( 4 ) THE controversy between the parties thus lies within a somewhat brief compass. If the Labour Court did not made any award in I. D. No. 33 of 1960 and I. O. No. 23 of 1961, it cannot successfully he contended that the present reference by the Government is bad. On the other hand, if the Labour Court had already made awards in I. D. No. 33 of 1960 and 23 of 1961, and they ware published in the Official Gazette on 12-10-1961, as stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner the impugned reference of the Government dated 2-12-1951 will have to be held invalid. The short question, therefore, is whether the Labour Court can be said to have been made awards in I. D. No. 33 of 1960 and I. D. No. 23 of 1961.

( 5 ) IT is common ground that the Labour Court, to use its own words, "dismissed the case for default of appearance of the workmen at the enquiry". That was the final order passed by the Labour Court in I. D. No- 33 of 1960 and I. D. No. 23 of 1961. The order of dismissal for default is claimed to be an award by the learned counsel for the petitioner, whereas the learned counsel for the respondents say, it is not. The expression award is defined in Section 2 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act as follows:-- "award" means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A". Admittedly, the Labour Court did not adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute referred to it. Nor did it solve the dispute. Yet it is claimed on behalf of the petitioner that there was a final determination of an industrial dispute by the Labour Court. I find it extremely difficult to accede to this contention. The "determination of any industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act means an adjudication of the dispute between the parties. The object of the decision called the award is to resolve the differences between the disputants. But it is urged for the petitioner that the word determination in the definition just means putting an en






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