Back
1963 Supreme(AP) 175
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : SHARFUDDIN AHMED
Dudik Bangaru - Appellant
Versus
Subnivasu Rama Rao - Respondent
Decided On : 09-25-63
A tenant in occupation of land situated in a minor inam on the date of commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1956 is entitled to a ryotwari patta for two-third share of the land under section 4 (2) (c) of the Act, and a decree for eviction cannot be executed to that extent.
Headnote:
INAMS ABOLITION ACT - OCCUPANCY RIGHTS - SECTION 4 (2) (C) - TENANT IN OCCUPATION ON DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF ACT ENTITLED TO RYOTWARI PATTA FOR TWO-THIRD SHARE - DECREE FOR EVICTION NOT EXECUTABLE TO THAT EXTENT.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a tenant in occupation of land situated in a minor inam, challenged the execution of a decree for delivery of possession obtained by the respondent on the ground that he had acquired occupancy rights in the land under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1956 (XXXVII of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Finding of the Court:
The lower courts held that the appellant could not object to the execution of the decree as he had not obtained a declaration of his right as contemplated under the Act. However, the High Court found that the appellant was in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of the Act and was therefore entitled to the benefit of section 4 (2) (c) of the Act, which entitled him to a ryotwari patta for two-third share of the land.
Issues: Whether the appellant, as a tenant in occupation of land situated in a minor inam, had acquired occupancy rights under the Act and was therefore entitled to resist the execution of the decree for delivery of possession.
Ratio Decidendi: The High Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 4 (2) (c) of the Act, which entitled him to a ryotwari patta for two-third share of the land, as he was in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of the Act. The Court further held that the decree for eviction could not be executed to the extent of two-third of the land as it would deprive the appellant of his right to a patta under the Act.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the decree for eviction was held to be inexecutable to the extent of two-third of the land.
( 2 ) AS stated above, both the Courts have proceeded on the footing that the executing court cannot go behind the decree and as the judgment-debtor had not obtained a declaration as provided under the Inams Abolition Act he was not entitled to raise the objection. It is to be noted, however, that under section 4 (2) (c) it has been provided that:" (c ). . . . . . . . and if no tenant has filed an application before the Revenue Court under subsection (2) of that section within the period specified therein, the tenant in the occupation of the land on the date of commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta for two-thirds share of that land and the inamdar shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta for the remaining one-third share thereof. "
( 3 ) IT is beyond dispute that the tenant has not filed any application before a revenue Court under section 5, sub-section (2) of the Act. So that, if the appellant was a tenant in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of this Act, he would be entitled to ryotwari patta for two-third share. The only question, therefore, for consideration was whether the appellant was in occupation of the land on the date of commencement of this Act, which came into force in December, 1956, Both the Courts below have not adverted to this aspect of the case and no objection seems to have been taken before the said Courts in regard to the occupation of the appellant as tenant. No doubt a decree for eviction has been passed against the appellant, but it was not executed and it was only when the E. P. was filed that this objection was raised. So that, it can be safely presumed that the appellant was in occupation of the land on 7th January, 1948, and even on the date of commencement of the Act.
( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent, however, has urged that the tenancy terminated as long back as 7th December, 1944, but there is no reference to this date or to the fact of the termination of tenancy in the judgment of the lower Courts. So that, it would be deemed that
