In order to obtain a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, show that there is a probability of success in the suit, and demonstrate that the balance of convenience is in their favour.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the order of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, declining to grant a temporary injunction restraining the respondents herein from receiving or taking delivery of all or any of the plaint schedule properties either moveable or immoveable, or to receive any amounts from the Receiver-cum-Commissioner appointed in C. S. No. 13 of 1958 on the file of the High Court pending disposal of the suit O. S. No. 23 of 1961 on the file of the City Civil Court, Hyderabad.

( 2 ) THE application was made under Order 39, Rule 2 pending a suit brought by the appellant in forma pauperis claiming to be the daughter of the Nawab Mir Yousuf AH Khan popularly known as Sir Salar Jung III (hereinafter to be referred to as the Nawab) for a declaration that she is the legitimate daughter of the said Nawab and for possession of his assets and properties.

( 3 ) SIR Salar Jung III died on 22-3-1949 leaving behind him enormous private properties and a big jagir which has become the subject-matter of endless litigation.

( 4 ) SHORTLY after his death, the Salar Jung Estate Administration Regulation 1358 F. i. e. , 34 of 1358 F. was enacted empowering the Government to appoint a Committee consisting of not more than five persons to be called the Salar Jung Estate Committee for the purpose of the administration of the estate of the Nawab. In exercise of these powers, H. E. II. the Nizam appointed a committee on the 3ist day of May, 1949, consisting of two Judges of the erstwhile Hyderabad High Court to enquire into the report on the succession to the late Nawab and within a few days the Commission entered upon its duties but it could not continue this enquiry for the reason that day order was obtained by some of the claimants in an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari questioning the validity of the "regulation and the powers of the Committee to hold an enquiry in that behalf. Finally, a Full Bench of that High Court decided that the Committee was not the proper forum for adjudicating the various questions that arose from the deceased Nawabs succession case. Meanwhile, the Union Parliament put on the Statute Book the Nawab Salar Jung Bahadur Administration of Assets Act, 1950 (Act XXXVI of 1950) vesting all the assets of the Nawab in the Salar Jung Estate Committee appointed for the purpose of administering the estate of the Nawab under the Salar Jung Estate Administration Regulation of Hyderabad adverted to above.

( 5 ) AFTER the decision of the High Court of Hyderabad, the 1st, 2nd and nth respondents herein filed suits in the City Civil Court as the heirs of the deceased Nawab claiming all his properties. All the suits were withdrawn to this Court and one of them was tried as C. S. No. 13 of 1958. To this suit were impleaded the then Government of India, the then Government of Hyderabad and the Salar Jung Estate Committee as parties. The suit ended in a compromise entered into between all the parties in 1959 and a memo embodying the terms thereof was filed into Court purspant to which a preliminary decree was passed by Kumarayya, J. Consequent upon this compromise to which the plaintiff and the defendants in the other suits were parties, the other two suits were withdrawn.

( 6 ) THE scheme of the compromise was that the heirs of the Nawab should relinquish their claim to the Museum known as the Salar Jung Museum, the library and some other items of property set out therein in favour of the Union Government in consideration of which the Government of India, the. Andhra Pradesh Government (which by then had come into being as a result of the reorganisation of States) and the Salar Jung Estate Administration Committee gave up their claim to the other assets of the Nawab.

( 7 ) IT is this decree that is challenged by the appellant on the contention that the parties to the suit had no manner of right or claim to the properties in this litigation and that the compromise itself was collusively obtai