The period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of a civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by section 48, Civil Procedure Code, is three years from the date of the decree or order, and not from the date of payment of Court-fee.

CHANDRA REDDY, CJ.

( 1 ) THIS appeal filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Judgment of our learned brother, Satyanarayana Raju, J. with his leave raises a question relating to the interpretation of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. The respondent filed O. S. No. 39 of 1944 on the file of the District Munsif s court, Kakinada, against the appellant for dissolution of partnership and settlement of accounts of a joint firm. A preliminary decree was passed for dissolution of" partnership and for accounts. This was followed up by a final decree, dated 1st August, 1945, under which it was declared that a sum of Rs. 507-13-11 was due to the appellant by the respondent together with costs and subsequent interest. The final decree contained a direction that it should not be executed until the requisite Court-fee was paid. The respondent carried the matter in appeal to the subordinate Judge s Court, Kakinada, in A. S. No. 202 of 1945 but it was ultimately dismissed on 28th June, 1946 for want of prosecution. An application for restoration of the appeal was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge s Court, Kakinada, and this was confirmed on appeal by the Madras High Court in A. A. O. No. 663 of 1946 on 20th April, 1948.

( 2 ) ON 12th May 1950, the appellant put in execution the final decree and it was rejected on 10th August, 1950. Another petition filed on 24th December, 1951 shared the same fate. The third execution petition (E. P. No. 228 of 1952) was filed by the appellant on 9th May, 1952. On objection being taken that the decreeholder had, not paid the Court-fee, the appellant deposited the Court-fee on 7th july, 1952.

( 3 ) THE petition was opposed inter alia on the ground that it was barred by time, as the first execution petition was filed beyond three years of the passing of the final decree. This plea found favour with the District Munsif, with the result that he dismissed the petition. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the Subordinate Judge s Court, kakinada, but without success. The Second Appeal preferred by him to this Court was dismissed by our learned brother, Satyanarayana Raju, J. At the same time, the learned Judge granted leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is this order that is now under appeal.

( 4 ) THE point presented by Sri Suryanarayana in support of this appeal is that for purposes of Article 182 of the Limitation Act time should be reckoned from the date on which the Court-fee was paid by the appellant, i. e. , from 7th July, 1952 as per the direction in the final decree. The final decree could not be enforced without the payment of Court-fee and, therefore, the date of the decree or order should be deemed to be the date on which the Court-fee was paid. Till the Court-fee was deposited into Court, there was no decree which was capable of execution. Consequently, the execution petition filed in May, 1950, would be in time, is the argument of Sri Suryanarayana.

( 5 ) IN support of his proposition, Sri Suryanarayana relies on the decision of the madras High Court in Satyanandam v. Nammayya. ,1 that was a case where a decree in a suit for partition of joint family properties directed payment of specific sums to individual members of the joint family and also provided for effecting division of the properties of the joint family. So, the decree operated as a preliminary decree as regards partition of the properties and as a final decree in respect of payment of specific sums of money to the individual members of the joint family. This decree was put in execution without getting it engrossed on non-judicial stamp paper, as required by Article 45 of the Stamp Act. When an objection was taken that the decree could not be executed till it was engrossed on a non-judicial stamp paper, non-judicial stamps were supplied but that was three years after the passing of the decree. The question arose whether this payment would validate the proceedings with retrospective effect on the pr

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