The distinction between the object of a conspiracy and the means adopted to achieve that object is crucial in determining whether consent under Section 196-A (2) CrPC is required for taking cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy.

( 1 ) THIS is a petition to revise the Order d/- 5-2-1960 passed by die Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Avanigadda in Cri. M. P. No. 14 of 1960 in p. R. C. No. 8 of 1953 on his file.

( 2 ) THE relevant facts of the case are briefly as follows;

( 3 ) THE Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies filed a complaint dated 20-6-1955 against Vadlamudi Kutumba Rao, the petitioner herein, to the effect that the latter, as the President of a Co-operative Society, had committed an offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 409 I. p. C. The Sub Inspector of Police, Pamarru registered a crime under Section 409 I. P. C. After investigation, he filed a charge-sheet against eighteen accused under Sections 120-B, 409, 467, 468, 471 and 193 I. P- C. Of these accused, Vadlamudi Kuntumba Rao is A-1 and was charged as the ex-President of the Co-operative Marketing Society, Pedamukthevi and A-2 to A-5 were charged as ex-Directors of the same society. The learned Magistrate took the case on file under various sections as a Preliminary Register Case and held preliminary enquiry. The examination-in-chief of P. W. 1 was over and the case was taken up on 18-1-1960 for the cross-examination of P. W. 1. Then, A-l put in a petition requesting the Magistrate to adopt the following courses : 1. To order re-investigation of the case, under Section 155 (2) Cr. P. C. on the ground that the investigation was perfunctory. 2. If he did not follow the first course, to commence the inquiry into the case according to the procedure laid down under Section 208 Cr. P. C. 3. If he did not follow the second course, then split up the charge-sheet into two, one in respect of section 409 I. P. C. and the other in respect of the other offences which were non-cognizable and to inquire into the latter offence under Section 208 Cr. P. C. and to forward the case under Section 409 I. P. C. for disposal to the First Class Magistrate having jurisdiction. The learned Magistrate dismissed the petition observing thus :"in the present case, the only witness which the prosecution proposed to examine is P. W. 1 and his Chief-examination is already over in May, 1959. The only other stage that remains to be covered is examination of the accused and hearing arguments. I am therefore, of opinion that this petition is an attempt to invite a premature decision on the merits of the case, and, therefore, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed, as premature at this juncture".

( 4 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Adavi Rama Rao, points out that there are nine witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet and that the procedure which the learned Magistrate is observing was under Section 207-A Cr. P. C. He contends that, as he was raising the ground of illegality of the investigation in the case, he had to raise it sufficiently early at that stage and that if he waited till the first witness was completely examined and arguments were heard, it would be open for the Magistrate to hold that the objection had not been raised in time. In H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (S) AIR 1955 SC 196 at p. 204 it has been held as follows : "if, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course or investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well- settled, as appears from the cases in Prabhu v. Emperor , AIR 1944 PC 73 and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, AIR 1950 PC 26. XXX XXx"it does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at sufficiently early stage, the C