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1959 Supreme(AP) 49
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : P.CHANDRA REDDY, SRINIVASA CHARI
Peyyeti Jagannadha Rao - Appellant
Versus
Pamarti Venkateswara Rao - Respondent
Decided On : 03-12-59
The Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer, while adjudicating disputes under the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956, were not Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 C.P.C., and therefore, their orders were not liable to revision under that provision.
Headnote:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 115 - REVISION - TAHASILDAR AND REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER - NOT CIVIL COURTS - ORDERS NOT REVISABLE.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners filed civil revision petitions under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) challenging the orders passed by the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer in disputes arising under the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956. The issue was whether the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer, while adjudicating disputes under the Act, constituted Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, thus making their orders liable to revision under Section 115 C.P.C.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer were not Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 C.P.C. and, therefore, their orders were not liable to revision under that provision.
Issues: 1. Whether the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer, while adjudicating disputes under the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956, constituted Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court? 2. Whether the orders passed by the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer were liable to revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court observed that the mere fact that a Tribunal has the trappings of a Court does not necessarily make it a Court. 2. The court relied on the provisions of Section 3 C.P.C., which defines the Courts subordinate to the High Court, and held that only Courts subject to the authority of the High Court could be deemed to be Courts subordinate to the High Court. 3. The court further noted that the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873, which consolidates and amends the law relating to the Civil Courts of the Madras Presidency subordinate to the High Court, sets out the Courts which are subordinate to the High Court. 4. The court concluded that the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer, not being subject to the authority of the High Court, could not be equated to Courts subordinate to the High Court.
Final Decision: The court held that the revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. were incompetent and upheld the preliminary objection. However, the petitioners were permitted to convert these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution, provided they paid the deficit court-fee within two weeks.
( 1 ) IN these Civil revision petitions, a preliminary objection is raised as to whether an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in an appeal against the order of the Tahsildar under Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy, Act (XVIII of 1956) is liable to be revised under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
( 2 ) IT is necessary for us to state the facts that have given rise to these revisions having regard to the nature of the present enquiry. The point that calls for determination depends upon whether the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer adjudicating disputes under this Act constitute Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court within the purview of Section 115 Civil Procedure Code.
( 3 ) SINCE the problem has to be tackled with reference to Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956, it is useful to read it here :"16 (1) Any dispute arising under this Act between a landlord and a cultivating tenant, including any question relating to the determination of fair rent or the eviction of a cultivating tenant shall on application by the landlord or the cultivating tenant, as the case may be, be decided by the Tahsildar after making an inquiry in the manner prescribed, (2) Against any order passed by the Tahsildar under Sub-Section (1), an appeal shall He to the Revenue Divisional Officer, within thirty days of the passing of the order; and the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer on such appeal shall fee final. "stress is laid by Sri Narasimham, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the provision in the section giving a finality to the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer, He argues that any Tribunal whose decision is final should be regarded as a Civil Court for purposes of Section 115 C. P. C. He also relied upon Rule 3 (6) of the Rules framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 of the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956. That rule confers certain powers on the Tahsildar holding an inquiry under the Act, such as the power to summon witnesses and call for production of documents, to examine parties and witnesses on oath and affirmation and reduce into writing statements made by the persons BO examined and to enter upon and inspect any land and do any other act which, in his Opinion, may be necessary for carrying out the provisions, of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. According to Sri Narasimham, importance should be attached to rule 3 (7), which requires the Tahsildar to pronounce every order passed by him in open Court. He argues that the rule making authority could not have meant anything else bat to assimilate the position of a Tahsildar to that of a Civil Court.
( 4 ) WE do not think that any of these tests propounded by Sri Narasimham are decisive in the matter. The very circumstance that only some of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were specifically made applicable to an enquiry by the Tahsildar indicates that he cannot be regarded as a Civil Court. If he were a Court, it would attract all the provisions of the Code and any provision in the Act in that behalf will be a superfluity. Nor could the fact that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is invested with finality be decisive. There are several Tribunals whose decisions are declared to be final by the statutes concerned. That does not carry with it the implication that such Tribunals are Civil Courts within the meaning of Section 115 C. P. C. Rule 3 (7) also does not carry the matter any further. Its only implication is that the order should be pronounced openly in the presence of all parties.
( 5 ) IN our opinion, the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officer on whom certain powers are conferred to decide certain disputes between the landlord and the tenant as indicated in the section, are administrative Tribunals empowered to discharge functions of a quasi-judicial nature. Assuming that the functions that they discharge are judicial in nature, still it is difficult
