A suit by the Managing Trustee of a Mutt, without impleading the other trustees, is not improperly constituted. The joinder of other trustees after the limitation period does not attract Section 22 of the Limitation Act.

SATYANARAYANA RAJU, J.

( 1 ) THESE cases were referred to the Full Bench because Umamaheswaram, J. , before whom they originally came up for disposal, considered it necessary that the conflict between the two Division Bench decisions of the Madras High Court in Kanda Poonappa Naicken v. Venkata Sesha Iyar 50 Ind Cas 353 (2) : (AIR 1919 Mad 809 (1) ) and Seerangathuni v. Vaithilinga Mudaliar, 40 Mad LT 532: (AIR 1921 Mad 528) should be resolved by a Full Bench.

( 2 ) THE relevant facts are few and not in dispute. There is an institution at Ongole, known by the name of the Byragi Mutt. The Mutt owns extensive landed properties, Pursuant to the decree dt. 23-1-1952 passed by the Subordinate Judges Court, Ongole, in O. S. No. 4 of 1951, the then trustees who were in management of the affairs of the institution, were removed from their office and three trustees were appointed, one of whom was designated the Managing Trustee. After obtaining possession of the lands belonging to the Mutt, the Managing Trustee filed suit Nos. 7 to 9 of 1953 on the file of the Small Causes Court, Ongole, on 20-6-1952 for recovery of damages for use and occupation on the ground that the defendants were in unauthorised occupation of the lands. The suits were resisted by the defendants mainly on the around that the actions brought only by one of the trustees were not maintainable. Thereupon the other two Trustees were impleaded as supplemental defendants in all the suits on 17-9-1953. Following the decision in Vedakannu v. Annadana Chairam, AIR 1938 Mad 982, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the suits must be deemed to have been properly instituted not on 20-6-1952 when the plaints were filed but on 17-9-1958 when the other two trustees were brought on record and that therefore the claim for damages for use and occupation for the year 1949-50 become burred by time. It was against this decision that the revision petitions were preferred by the Managing Trustee of the Mutt.

( 3 ) THE question to be determined in these cases is whether or not the suit claim for the year 1949-50 is barred by limitation.

( 4 ) THERE is no doubt that when first brought, the suits were well within the statutory period, but it is contended by the respondents that they were not then brought by all the proper and necessary plaintiffs and that afterwards when the record was amended in that respect, the statutory time had expired.

( 5 ) SECTION 22 (1), Limitation Act, provides as follows :"where, after the institution of a suit a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. "

( 6 ) NOW, the question whether the joinder of parties after the institution of a suit shall necessarily involve the bar of limitation if the prescribed period has expired, must depend upon the answer to the question whether the joinder was necessary to enable the court to award the relief in the suit as framed. The test to he applied is whether the suit was properly constituted on the date of the plaint so as to enable the court to adjudicate as between the parties impleaded. A suit is no; said to be properly constituted unless all the necessary parties are impleaded. Persons who ought to be joined as parties are called necessary parties. They are persons necessary to the constitution of the suit, i. e. , persons in whose absence no effective decree at all can be passed. If necessary parties are not impleaded, the suit is bad for non-joinder and the addition of those parties after the period of limitation will necessitate the dismissal of the suit. If, however, at the inception, the necessary parties are impleaded, the non-joinder of other persons who are not necessary or indispensable hut whose joinder is only desirable to safeguard their rights and the rights of others and to prevent further litigation does not render the suit as improperly constituted and the joinder of those parties after the period of

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