Back
1959 Supreme(AP) 113
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : SANJEEVA ROW NAIDU
Public Prosecutor - Appellant
Versus
Nelluru Subrahmanyam - Respondent
Decided On : 07-13-59
The prosecution must establish that the accused had knowledge of the misbranding and that the sale was made with his consent, connivance, or neglect in order to secure a conviction under Section 16 read with Sections 7 and 2(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Headnote:
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT - SECTION 16, 7, 2(J) - MISBRANDED FOOD - INTERPRETATION OF RULES 29 AND 30 - SALE OF MISBRANDED FOOD - KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT - SCOPE OF SECTION 2(XIII) - FOOD INSPECTOR'S AUTHORITY TO FILE COMPLAINT - SECTION 20 - SANITARY INSPECTOR'S INVOLVEMENT IN COMPLAINT - SECTION 17(2) - PROSECUTION OF COMPANY AND ITS OFFICERS - CONSENT, CONNIVANCE, OR NEGLECT - BURDEN OF PROOF.
Fact of the Case:
The accused, the Managing Partner of Sri Rama Trading Company, was charged with selling misbranded redgram (dhall) under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Food Inspector purchased three samples of dhall from the accused's premises and found them to contain an artificial water-soluble yellow coloring matter derived from coal-tar, rendering them misbranded. The accused claimed that he was unaware of the misbranding and that the dhall was not intended for sale but was being stored temporarily due to its damaged condition.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the accused could not be convicted under Section 16 read with Sections 7 and 2(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act because the prosecution failed to establish that the accused had knowledge of the misbranding or that the sale was made with his consent, connivance, or neglect. The court also held that the Food Inspector's complaint was valid despite the involvement of an unauthorized Sanitary Inspector and that the accused's prosecution was not barred by Section 17(2) of the Act since the necessary elements of consent, connivance, or neglect were not proven.
Issues: 1. Whether the accused had knowledge of the misbranding of the dhall and whether the sale was made with his consent, connivance, or neglect. 2. Whether the Food Inspector's complaint was valid despite the involvement of an unauthorized Sanitary Inspector. 3. Whether the accused's prosecution was barred by Section 17(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Rules 29 and 30 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and held that Rule 30, which sets a maximum limit for permissible color additives, must be read in conjunction with Rule 29, which prohibits the use of coal tar dyes in certain foodstuffs, including dhall. Therefore, the use of any coal tar dye in dhall is prohibited, regardless of the quantity. 2. The court held that the involvement of an unauthorized Sanitary Inspector in the complaint did not invalidate the complaint since the Municipal Health Officer, who was authorized to file the complaint, had also signed and filed it. 3. The court held that the prosecution of the accused under Section 17(2) of the Act was not maintainable because the prosecution failed to prove that the offence was committed with the consent, connivance, or neglect of the accused.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the acquittal of the accused.
( 1 ) THESE appeals are directed against the judgment and order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Visakhapatnam directing the acquittal of the respondent, hereinafter referred to as the accused, of the three charge-sheets preferred against him under Section 16 read with Sections 7 and 2 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Central Act No. 37 of 1954) hereinafter referred to as the Act
( 2 ) THE facts of the prosecution case are briefly as follows: On 10-8-1957, the Food Inspector, complainant in the case, proceeded to the premises of the Markendeya Rice Mill and found there a number of bags with TOOR Dhall stocked, in all amounting to 98 bags. He wanted that three quarters seer of the redgram contained in these bags be sold to him for Rs. 0-6-6. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused is the Managing Partner of Sri Rama Trading Company which company was a whole-sale dealer in pulses and other food-stuffs, that the accused is also a partner of die Markendeya Rice Mill at Visakhapatnam and that the 98 bags of Dhall have been stocked on the premises of the Markendeya Rice Mill for and on behalf of Sri Rama Trading Company. He noticed that the three lots of bags were emitting bad smell and he could know from the smell that the stocks were drenched in water. After having purchased the three quarters seer of red gram from each of the lots, the complainant (P. W. 1) prepared in the presence of mediators three separate samples and making each sample into three parts, placed them in three bottles, which were duly sealed in the presence of the witnesses. One of the bottles containing the sample from one lot, along with two other bottles similarly containing samples from the other two lots were sent to the Food Analyst, whose report showed that each one of the samples consisting of redgram shall contained an artificial water-soluble yellow coloring matter derived from coal-tar and hence the Analyst round that each of the samples sent to him was mis-branded. Hence the prosecution.
( 3 ) THE learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, who tried the cases acquitted the accused, basing his acquittal on an erroneous view of the construction of Rule 30 of the Rules framed by the Central Government in exercise of the rule-making power conferred under the Act. He took the view that Rule 30 prescribed the maximum limit of permissible colour which may be added to any food as one grain per pound of food. From this, the learned Magistrate concluded that Rule 30 and rule 29 need not be read together. Rule 29 provides that coal tar dyes or synthetic organic colors within the permissible limits could only be employed in respect of the food stuffs enumerated in the said rule, which list did not include dhall, and concluded that under rule 30 colour may be added to any food. He held that rule 30 is not subordinate to Rule 29, and that, as in this case the quantity of colour that was shown to be contained in the samples of dhall did not amount to the maximum provided in the rule 30, the learned Magistrate held that the samples of dhall in question were not misbranded and on that ground acquitted the accused.
( 4 ) I have no hesitation in holding that the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate was entirely wrong in the view he took of the Rules 29 and SO. . In this connection, it is necessary to note that Rule 26 contained a list of natural coloring matters that could be used in or upon any article of food. We are not concerned with this rule. Rule 27 prohibited the use of any form of inorganic colour or pigments in any article of food. Rule 28 specified the use of coal tar dyes in food and Item (e) of this rule, refers to Tartazine (F. D. C. Yellow No. 5), which is the colour matter that is alleged by the prosecution to have been used in this case. Rule 29 is as follows :"use of Permitted Synthetic Organic Colors or Coal Tar Dyes Prohibited : Use of permitted Synthetic organic colors or coal tar dyes in or upon any
