The transferee Court has jurisdiction to consider all objections relating to the execution of the decree and there is no limitation on its power in that behalf.

CHANDRA REDDY, C. J.

( 1 ) THE question referred to the Full Bench is whether the transferor Court is bound to hear objections as to the excitability of a decree raised by the judgment-debtor before an order for transmission is made.

( 2 ) THE respondent obtained a decree in O. S. No. 203 of 1948 against the appellant for a sum of Rs. 12,000. 00 with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from 1-9-1948 till realisation. Having unsuccessfully levied execution till the year 1954, the respondent applied for transmission of the decree to the District Court, Eluru, within whose jurisdiction the properties of the appellant are situated. The appellant opposed the application attacking the validity of the decree. The trial Court transmitted the decree to the District Court, Eluru, with the remark that the appellant would renew his application for the relief sought by him if he was so advised. That order is impeached by the aggrieved judgment-debtor in this appeal.

( 3 ) IT is urged by Sri Sankara Sastry on behalf of the appellant that before the Court which passed the decree could send the decree for execution to another Court, it was obligatory on its part to hear and decide all objections bearing on the executability of the decree, and the transferor Court would not leave that matter to the transferee Court. This argument is founded on some rulings of the Madras High Court, Rajitagiripathi v. K. B. Sankaran, 1924 Mad WN 527: (AIR 1924 Mad 673), Muthuveera-swami v. Annamalai Chettiar, 192g Mad WN 120- (AIR 1926 Mad 411), Arnnachalam Pillai v. Shan-mugham Pillai, 1928 0 Madwn 152, Subramanian Chutriar v. Ramanathan Chcttiar, 1929 Mad WN 30: (AIR 1929 Mad 199) and Kondala Rao v Saravayya, 1954-1 Mad LJ 394.

( 4 ) THE counsel for the appellant also cited to us a few of the Calcutta rulings, which will be adverted to presently. So far as the Madras cases go, they do favour the view advanced on behalf of the appellant.

( 5 ) IN the first of the cases, the view taken is that in an application for transfer of a decree, when notice of it is issued to the judgment-debtor, the latter should plead limitation and if he omits to do so, it would not be permissible for him to urge it in the transferee Court since Section 11, Explanation IV, C. P. C. would apply to such a case. Dealing with this doctrine of constructive res judicata, Odgers J. . who delivered the opinion of the Court said :"if the decree is barred by limitation, the transfer of it to another Court is a mere anfractuous proceeding which ought not to be taken and therefore if a valid plea of limitation is available, it should be urged in order to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. "the principle was adopted by other Benches of the same Court in 1928 Mad WN 120: (AIR 1926 Mad 411) and in 1928 0 Madwn 152 and 1929 Mad WN 36: (AIR 1929 Mad 199 ). (B) In 1954-1 Mad LJ 394, while accepting the doctrine of those decisions, I drew a distinction between the objections which affect execution and those which merely relate to particulars of property to be proceeded against and of a like nature. I said [hat the rule of res judicata could apply to the former category of cases which involved a decision on the executability of the decree and not to the latter.

( 6 ) A contrary opinion was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Sreepati Charan v. Shamaldhone Dutt, 15 Callj 123. The learned Judges went to the extent of saying that the judgment-debtor could not, at the stage of the transfer of the decree, contend that the decree was barred by limitation. They opined that the question, whether the decree in so far as it was unexcitable could be executed under law, was a question, for determination by the Court to which the decree was transferred when a proper application for execution was presented to the Court. They further held that, even though notice might be issued to the judgment-debtor upon an application for transfer of the decree, it was not competent for him to appear and contend at that

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