1957 Supreme(AP) 266

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : BHIMASANKARAM
Karutha Kritya Rameswaraswami Varu represented by its Executive - Appellant
Versus
R.Ramalinga Raju - Respondent
Decided On : 11-22-57

The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the proceedings of the Tribunal only "as far as practicable".

Headnote:

ESTATES ABOLITION - REVIEW - JURISDICTION OF TRIBUNAL - ERROR APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD - RES JUDICATA - INAM ESTATE - DEFINITION - GRANT OF LESS THAN A VILLAGE - WHETHER AN INAM ESTATE - MADRAS ESTATES (ABOLITION AND CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT (XXVI OF 1948), SECS. 2 (7), 3 (2) (D), 9, 64-A, 67, 8 (4), 51 - MADRAS BUILDINGS (LEASE AND RENT CONTROL) ACT (XXX OF 1949) - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (V OF 1908), ORDER 47, RULES 1, 2.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner is the Executive Officer of the temple of Sri Krutha Kritya Rameswaraswami Vanu situate in Gudimoola Rameswaram, a village in Rajole Taluk in East Godavari District. The temple owns an inam known as Gudimoola Khandrika. After the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of 1948) was passed, the Seltlement Officer, Vijayawada initiated proceedings suo motu under Section 9 of the Act to determine whether the Khandrika aforesaid is an inam estate as defined in Section 2 (7) of the Act. The 1st respondent congested the position taken up by the Devasthanam and contended that Gudimoola Khandrika when it was granted was by itself a village, and that in any case the matter was concluded by a decision of the Privy Council and two decisions of the High Court of Madras; that further the grant to the temple consisted only of melwaram and that the grant therefore constituted an inam estate within the meaning of the Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer recorded a finding basing himself on the decision of the Privy Council that Gudimool Khandrika was a whole village inam and that it was also an inam estate. The Devasthanam filed an appeal before the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vijayanagaram against the finding of the Settlement Officer, and it was numbered as A. S. 456 of 1950 on its file. The Tribunal considered the whole material placed before it by the learned counsel on both sides and finally rendered a decision on 13-5-52 upholding the contention of the appellant before them that the Khandrika in question was not an inam estate. The 1st respondent, however, presented to the Tribunal a few days later a petition, purporting to he one made under Order 47 Rules 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also under the rules framed under the Madras Act XXVI of 1948, for review of its judgment. By its order dated 16/10/1952, the Tribunal set aside its earlier judgment and passed an order dismissing A. S. No. 456 of 1950.

Finding of the Court:

The Tribunal has the power of review under Rule 2 of the rules made under Section 67 of the Act. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the proceedings of the Tribunal only "as far as practicable". The word "judge" in Order 47 Rule 2, C. P. C. is not to be interpreted as meaning all the original members of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was in error in holding that the decisions of the High Court and the Privy Council arising out of O. S. Nns. 72 and 73 of 1919 on the (sic) of the Sub-Court, Rajabrnundry and the decision (sic) High Court in S. A. No. 1254 of 1948 were binding upon the parties as being res judicata or at east as pronouncements of great force upon the (sic) now raised before the Tribunal.

Issues: 1. Whether the Tribunal has the power of review under Rule 2 of the rules made under Section 67 of the Act? 2. Whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the proceedings of the Tribunal only "as far as practicable"? 3. Whether the word "judge" in Order 47 Rule 2, C. P. C. is to be interpreted as meaning all the original members of the Tribunal? 4. Whether the Tribunal was in error in holding that the decisions of the High Court and the Privy Council arising out of O. S. Nns. 72 and 73 of 1919 on the (sic) of the Sub-Court, Rajabrnundry and the decision (sic) High Court in S. A. No. 1254 of 1948 were binding upon the parties as being res judicata or at east as pronouncements of great force upon the (sic) now raised before the Tribunal?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The language of Rules 1 and 2, particularly of Rule 2, carries with it the grant of the power of review. It is true that if Rule 2 alone could be said to confer that power and not Rule 1, the result it might be argued, would be that the Special Tribunal (the two judges of the High Court acting as such a Tribunal) appointed under Section 51 of the Act will not have the power to review while the- Tribunal may have it. But it is unnecessary for me to decide whether the power is granted under one rule or the other, I hold that the language of Rule 2 is clearly wide enough to confer the power even if I may not be j right in holding that the language of Rule 1 is com- prehensive to cover it. 2. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the proceedings of the Tribunal only "as far as practicable". 3. The word "judge" in Order 47 Rule 2, C. P. C. is not to be interpreted as meaning all the original members of the Tribunal. The limitations imposed by Rule 2 of Order 47 upon the ordinary Courts are based upon a policy which does not necessarily apply when a Court or a Tribunal consists of several members, all of them acting together. 4. The Tribunal was in error in holding that the decisions of the High Court and the Privy Council arising out of O. S. Nns. 72 and 73 of 1919 on the (sic) of the Sub-Court, Rajabrnundry and the decision (sic) High Court in S. A. No. 1254 of 1948 were binding upon the parties as being res judicata or at east as pronouncements of great force upon the (sic) now raised before the Tribunal. It is true that in the decision in the litigalion which went up to the Privy Council I here was no conflict between the Devasthanam and the persons claiming occupancy rights in the inam. That was a litigation between the Devasjhanani on the one hand and the Government on the other. The decision the such a litigation is clearly no; res judicata between the present parties, who must be deemed to be the Devasthanam on the one hand and the ryots on the other. Again, S. A. No. 1254 of 1948 arose out of a suit between the Devasthanam and an individual tenant who could not he said to have represent-ed all the ryots of the village. In that view it cannot the said to be binding upon anybody other than that particular party even under Section 64-A of the Act. But still the judgments in both the cases are pronouncements made by civil courts of highest authority upon questions that fall to be decided by the Tribunal.

Final Decision: Writ Petition fails and must be dismissed with costs one set. Advocates fee Rs. 200. 00