SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1956 Supreme(AP) 7

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Kuchibotla Kanakamma - Appellant
Versus
Tadepalli Ranga Rao - Respondent
Decided On : 01-11-56

Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to cases of continuing wrong, where a fresh cause of action arises de die in diem. The obstruction to a right of way by the construction of a permanent structure constitutes a continuing wrong, and the cause of action for the continuance of the wrong arises afresh every day.

Headnote:

EASEMENT - RIGHT OF WAY - OBSTRUCTION - CONTINUING WRONG - LIMITATION ACT, 1908, SECTION 23 - APPLICABILITY - DISPOSSESSION OR OUSTER - DISTINCTION - EASEMENTS ACT, 1882, SECTIONS 37, 47 - INTERPRETATION.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiffs, as owners of sites and buildings on either side of a lane, brought a suit for an injunction against the defendants, alleging that the latter had obstructed their access to a public road by putting up a cross-wall and constructing structures on a portion of the lane. The defendants claimed that the portion of the lane in question belonged to them and that they had acquired a prescriptive title to it by virtue of their possession for over 12 years.

Finding of the Court:

The lower courts held that the obstruction to the plaintiffs' right of way was a continuing wrong and that the suit was not barred by limitation under section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

Issues: 1. Whether the obstruction to the plaintiffs' right of way constituted a continuing wrong within the meaning of section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908? 2. Whether the defendants had acquired a prescriptive title to the portion of the lane in question by virtue of their possession for over 12 years?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to cases of continuing wrong, where a fresh cause of action arises de die in diem. The obstruction to the plaintiffs' right of way by the defendants' construction of a motor garage and other structures constituted a continuing wrong, as it created a continuing source of injury to the plaintiffs and was of such a nature as to render the defendants responsible for its continuance. 2. The defendants' possession of the portion of the lane in question did not amount to a dispossession or ouster of the plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs had only an easement of a right of way over the lane and not the right to possession. Therefore, section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied, and the plaintiffs' suit was not barred by limitation.

Final Decision: The second appeal was dismissed, and the decree of the lower courts was upheld.

( 1 ) DEFENDANTS, husband and wife, are the appellants in this second appeal which is preferred against a decree granting a mandatory injunction directing them to remove a cross-wall and certain other sti uctures from the portion ABNM of the pathway marked A. B. C. D. in the plan attached to the decree and a permanent injunction restraining them fiom obstructing the free passage of the plaintiffs through the lane A. B. C. D. The lane ABCD was originally a part of a large block of land belonging to one Cherukuru Subba Rao who divided it into several plots and sold them as building sites to different individuals some of whom have subsequently built houses thereon. The lane A. B. C. D. is 9 feet wide and runs between and along the whole length of the backyards of two rows of sites and houses situated to the north and south. The lane A. B. C. D. opens into a public road both on the east and the west, at the places indicated as C. D. and A. B. respectively. The defendants house P. N. B. B1 is situate north of the lane at its westernmost extremity. The portion of the lane just behind the house P. N. B. B1, is marked as A. B. N. M. and it is on this plot A. B. N. M. that the structures complained against are found. The finding of the Courts below, which I accept, is that when Subbarao the original owner of the entire block of land divided it into parcels and sold them as building sites, the lane A B C D was set apart for serving as a common pathway for the owners of the plots on either side, particularly for their servants, sweepers and scavengers. The plaintiffs, as owners of the sites and buildings on either side of the lane A. B. C. D. brought the present suit on 2nd May, 1949, for an injunction, both mandatory and prohibitory, against the defendants alleging that the latter had, four years before suit, put up a cross-wall across the lane, along the line M. N. thereby obstructing plaintiffs access through the lane to the public road lying to the west and had also started the erection of some structures at the points A and B so as to close the lane at one end along A. B. According to the defendants, the portion of the lane A. B. N. M. lying next south of their house N B B1 P belonged to them, that even otherwise their predecessors in title had effectively blocked the passage through A. B. N. M. as early as 1934 by the construction of a motor garage and that the defendants had therefore acquired a prescriptive title to the portion of the land marked A. B. N. M. The suit was stated to be barred by limitation.

( 2 ) THE only point argued before me was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Courts below have held, after an examination of some reported decisions, that the invsion of the plaintiffs right of way by the defendants and their predecessors-in-title was a continuing wrong, that a fresh cause of action arose di die in diem to the plaintiffs and that the suit was not barred by limitation having regard to section 23 of the Limitation Act. In this view, the suit was decreed.

( 3 ) AT the outse , it is necessary to state a few relevant facts. Exhibit A-1 dated 26th February, 1929, was the sale c f the site B B1 P N by the original owner Subbarao to Venkata Krishna Rao, the defendants predecessor-in-title. Exhibit A-1 does not include the portion of the lane A B N M now encroached upon by the construction of a motor garage but refers, on the other hand, to the lane as the southern boundary of the site sold. The sons of the vendee under Exhibit A-1 who had built a house on the site B B1 P N sold the house to one Venkatappayya under exhibit B-1 dated 4th November, 1938. This sale deed included not only the house and the site B B1p N conveyed under Exhibit A-1 but also that portion of the lane adjacent to the house on the south marked as A B N M. The length and breadth of the property sold given in Exhibit B-1 as well as the description of the southern boundary clearly show that the portion of the lane marked A B N M on whi










Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top