A suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for restoration of possession of immovable property from which a person has been dispossessed without consent, is not barred by Section 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, as the remedy sought is not required to be settled or decided under the provisions of the Tenancy Act.

( 1 ) THIS is a revision against the judgment of the Munsif, Huzuroagar, dismissing the suit under section 9 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 filed by the Revision-Petitioner on the ground that Section 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands act (XXI of 1950), bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The learned Munsif held that the revision-petitioner had admitted in certain revenue proceedings that the respondent was his tenant and presumably applying Section 37 of the Hyderabad tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, came to the conclusion that the respondent was a protected tenant within the meaning of that section and consequently, (though he does not say so in so many words) he very probably thought that landlords should apply to the Tahsildar under Section 32 (2) instead of seeking a remedy in a Civil Court, the jurisdiction of which, accotding to him, is barred by section 99. Section 99 is as follows :" (1) Save as provided in this Act no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or by the Board of Revenue or government. (2) No order of the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or of the Board of Bevenue or government made under this Act, shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. "

( 2 ) THE essential thing which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is that which is required to be settled or decided or dealt with by a Tahsildar, Tribunal or collector or by the Board of Revenue or Government under the provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the remedy sought for by the revisionpetitioner is required to be settled, or decided under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. In order to determine this it is necessary to state a few facts. The revision-petitioner was in possession of her lands when she alleged the respondents ejected her forcibly without any legal justification. The Munsif came to the conclusion on the evidence that she was in fact illegally ejected by the respondents four months prior to the suit. It is as a result of this action of the respondents that she filed a suit under Section 9 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963, which in so far as it is relevant is as under:"if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. "

( 3 ) THE question, therefore, is whether the revision-petitioner could under the provisions of this Central Act seek the remedy under Section 9 or should she be obliged to have recourse to the provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act. The only provisions to which my attention has been directed by the learned advocate for the revision-petitioner is sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the tenancy Act which is as under:" (2) No landholder shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar, for which he shall apply in the prescribed form. "

( 4 ) ACCORDING to this provision if a tenant was in possession of any land or dwelling house, it will be obligatory on the landholder to apply in the prescribed form to the Tahsildar. He cannot, therefore, in such circumstances have recourse to a civil suit under Section 99 to eject the tenant, but this case is the reverse of what is contemplated in sub-section (2) of Section 32. Here the landholder has been ejected from her possession. There is no provision in the Tenancy Act where- under she could apply for restoration of possession and it, therefore, follows that she must have recourse to the civil or criminal law and seek remedy in a Civil or criminal Court as the case may be. This appears to be the position on a general reading of the relevant provisions of the Act to which