1955 Supreme(AP) 154
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : VISWANATHA SASTRY
EDLAPALLI KOTAMMA - Appellant
Versus
NALLAPANENI MANGAMMA - Respondent
Decided On : 08-07-55
A right of appeal is an important right possessed by litigants and such a right can only be given up by a clear agreement either in express terms or by necessary implication.
Headnote:
APPEAL - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WAIVER - AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES - WHETHER RIGHT OF APPEAL WAIVED - INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT - PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE.
Fact of the Case:
In a suit for a mandatory injunction and a permanent injunction, the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the court after personal inspection and dispensing with oral evidence. The District Munsif inspected the locality and gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed, but the lower appellate court held that the appeal was incompetent.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the agreement between the parties did not amount to a waiver of the right of appeal. The court distinguished between cases where the proceedings were extra cursum curiae and cases where the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the parties merely agreed to dispense with oral evidence and invite the court to make a local inspection.
Issues: Whether the agreement between the parties amounted to a waiver of the right of appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the right of appeal is an important right possessed by litigants and such a right can only be given up by a clear agreement either in express terms or by necessary implication. The court held that the agreement in the present case did not contain any express waiver of the right of appeal and that there was no necessary implication that the parties intended to waive their right of appeal.
Final Decision: The court held that the appeal to the lower appellate court was competent and reversed the decree of the lower appellate court.
( 1 ) THIS second appeal arises out of a suit filed in the Court of the District munsiff of Guntur for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove certain bunds put up by them and for a permanent injunction restraining them from obstructing the flow of surplus water from plaintiffs land. The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds. A commissioner was appointed to inspect the locality and he prepared certain plans and submitted his reports. Before the trial began, the parties signed and filed a memorandum in court in the following terms:"both parties agreed to abide by the decision of the Honourable Court after personal inspection. The parties are not adducing oral evidence. Documentary evidence can be received. "the District Munsif inspected the locality and placed on record a detailed note of the physical features of the locality, the height and length of the bunds and other relevant matters. On the basis of the commissioner s plans and reports and his own personal inspection, the District Munsif gave judgment for the plaintiffs. A decree was also drawn up in the usual course. Against the decree, the 1st defendant preferred an appeal, but the appeal was rejected by the lower appellate court on the ground that it was incompetent. The question in this second appeal is whether the lower appellate court was right in holding that, in the circumstances of the case, no appeal lay to it, from the decree of the trial court. Learned Counsel for the appellant and the respondent each cited a decision of the Madras High Court as supporting his contention. Before considering the decisions cited as well as others, I should like to refer to certain general principles and the relevant statutory provisions. S. 96 C. P. Code provides a right of appeal from the decree of a court exercising original jurisdiction " save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force". S. 96 (3) provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed with the consent of parties. In some of the decided cases, decisions of the kind now in question have been treated as consent decrees or orders. In my opinion, however, this is not a correct view to take. Order 23 rule 3 C. P. C. provides the procedure to be followed in passing consent decrees. It has been ruled by the Judicial Committee that when a decree is passed by consent of parties it should always so appear on the face of the decree when drawn up. Vide zakir-ul-said v. Lachmi narayana . Where both parties to a suit ask the court to pass a decree in accordance with a lawful compromise arrived at between them, the court has no discretion but only a duty to record the compromise and pass a consent decree. Vide Surendranath v. Tarabala. Since a consent decree merely embodies the terms of the contract between the parties and is a mere creature of the agreement on which. it is founded, a right of appeal from this decree is not given. In the present case, the terms of the decree were not agreed to by the parties but were imposed upon them by the court and the court did not and could not have acted under order 23 rule 3 C. P. Code when passing the decree. S. 96 (3) C. P. Code does not therefore debar an appeal in this case. The view has been taken in some cases that the decision of the court in a case like the present is in the nature of an award of an arbitrator and is therefore not open to appeal. In Nidamarthi Mukkanti v. Thammanna Ramayya where the facts were similar to the present case, the learned Judges held that the district Munsif acted as an arbitrator by consent of parties and consequently no appeal lay from his decision which must be treated as an award. The court held that the decree passed in accordance with what they considered to be an award was not open to appeal by reason of S. 522 C. P. Code 1882 corresponding to Schedule II para 16 (2) of the C. E. Code of 1908. Both sections 521 and 522 C. P. Cod