ORDER (Per Bilal Nazki, J.)

All these revisions raise common questions of law and fact and therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. Several applications were filed before the trial Court and the trial Court passed a common order, which is challenged by way of these revisions. It appears that an award was passed in terms of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Arbitration Act) by respondent No.1 in these revisions. The present petitioners filed applications seeking a direction to the applicants in applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to deposit 75% of the amount awarded or to dismiss the main O.Ps. for non-compliance of Section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Act). The applications were dismissed by the Court. Therefore, these revisions are being filed.

4. An interesting question was raised before the Court below and it has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that in terms of the 1993 Act, no award can be questioned unless 75% of the amount awarded by the arbitrator is deposited. Though this argument appears to be attractive, but on analysis, the argument cannot be accepted. Before analyzing the submissions made, it may be pointed out that the 1993 Act was enacted to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Under Section 3 of the 1993 Act, liability is placed on buyers to make the payment. Under Section 4 of this Act, dates from which and the rates at which the interest is payable, are mentioned. Section 6(1) of the 1993 Act lays down-

"The amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force."

Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of this Act is not relevant for the purpose of the present controversy.

Section 7 of the 1993 Act lays down-

"No appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or as the case may be other order in the manner directed by such court or, as the case may be, such authority."

5. The learned counsel for petitioners contends that once recovery is sought either by way of filing of a suit or by way of any other proceedings including arbitration under the Arbitration Act, and an award or decree is obtained and if such award or decree is challenged by the other side, Section 7 of the 1993 Act comes into operation and no appeal against any decree, award or order could be entertained unless 75%ofthe awarded amount or decreed amount is deposited. According to him, an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act would be an appeal within the meaning of Section 7 of the 1993 Act, and the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is nothing but an appeal against the award.

6. To appreciate this argument, one has to see as to what is meant by an appeal and whether an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act could be termed as an appeal.

The dictionary meaning of the word "appeal" is, "Removal of the cause or a suit from an inferior Court to a superior Judge or Court for re-examination or review." This is a settled law that appellate jurisdiction involves are-hearing on law as well as on facts and is being invoked by an aggrieved person. In Whartons Law Lexicon, the word "appeal" is defined as, "The judicial examination of the decision by a higher Court of the decision of an inferior Court. As such, appeal

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