ORDER (Per G.S. Singhvi, CJ.)

This is a petition for quashing order dated 07-10-2005. passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (for short the Tribunal;) in SANo.14 of 2004 and also the sale conducted by State Bank of India (for short the Bank) for realization of its dues.

2. In the affidavit filed by him, the petitioner has averred that he purchased semi-finished flat No.307, Prameela Towers, Kakaguda, Secunderabad from M/s. Siri Constructions vide registered sale deed dated 25-09-2000. For the purpose of purchasing the flat, he applied to the Bank for sanction of a term loan of RS.6,00,000/-, which was duly sanctioned. It has been further averred that even though the terms of agreement entered with the builder postulated disbursement of loan by the Bank in instalments subject to the stage-wise completion of construction work, the Bank authorities released the entire loan amount ignoring the fact that the builder had not taken steps to complete the construction work. Still further, it has been averred that even though notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short the Act) was not served on him, the Bank resorted to the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act and tried to dispose of the property and the Tribunal dismissed the application filed under Section 17 of the Act without assigning cogent reasons.

3. Shri M.L. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the order of the Tribunal by arguing that the reasons assigned by it for refusing to entertain the application filed by the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act are legally untenable. Shri Prasad submitted that while dismissing the petitioners application, the Tribunal completely overlooked the fact that notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act had not been served on the writ petitioner. He emphasized that service of notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act constitutes a condition precedent to the taking of action under Section 13(4) of the Act and as the Bank failed to comply with this condition, the Tribunal should have annulled the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Act and further action taken by the Bank for disposal of the property.

4. Shri K.B. Ramanna Dora, learned counsel for respondent No.2 argued that the writ petition should be dismissed because the petitioner has failed to avail the statutory alternative remedy of appeal in terms of Section 18 of the Act.

5. We have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments. In our opinion, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an effective alternative remedy to the petitioner, which he has failed to avail. The question whether the High Court should entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution despite the fact that an effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioner has been considered by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases. In A. V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S. Wadhwani1 the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court while reiterating the rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, exhaust the other remedies open to him under the law is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition but is a rule evolved by the Courts for the exercise of their discretion, observed as under:

"The wide proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est and that in all other cases, Courts should not entertain petitions under Art.226, or in any event not grant any relief to such p

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