These two transfer C.M.Ps. are between the same parties and in relation to the same cause of action. Hence, they are disposed of through a common order. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to, as arrayed in Transfer C.M.P.No. 298 of 2006.

2. The petitioner is a Corporation established by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It issued a notice, dated 5-10-2004 inviting tenders for sale of cleaning nuts of about 2500 quintals, stored at four centres. The second respondent submitted its tender for purchase of quantity at Hyderabad centre and it emerged as the highest bidder, by quoting Rs. 4,500/- per quintal. The tender was accepted and the contract came into existence.

3. The petitioner initiated steps for forfeiture of the E.M.D. of about Rs.10 lakhs. The respondents filed O.S.No.209 of 2006 in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, challenging the forfeiture. The petitioner, on the other hand, filed O.S.No.112 of 2006 in the Court of II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam for recovery of a sum of Rs. 54,80,000/- towards damages said to have been suffered by it, on account of breach, alleged to have been committed by the respondents.

4. Transfer C.M.P. No.298 of 2006 is filed with a prayer to transfer O.S.No.209 of 2006 from the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, to the Court of II Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam, so that it can be tried along with O.S.No.112 of 2006 pending in that Court. Transfer C.M.P.No.395 of 2006 is filed by the respondents for exactly opposite relief.

5. Sri Sridhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner submits that the tender notification emanated from the head office of the petitioner at Visakhapatnam, and there is a clause in the conditions conferring exclusive jurisdiction at Visakhapatnam, and in that view of the matter the suit filed by the respondents herein deserves to be transferred to the appropriate Court at Visakhapatnam.

6. Sri Surya Prakash Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits L that the entire transaction i.e., receiving tenders and finalization of contract had taken place at Hyderabad and in that view of the matter, it cannot be said that his client has filed the suit in a Court, which does not have jurisdiction. Both the counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court, in support of their respective contentions.

7. The effect and purport of clauses conferring jurisdiction in the Courts at a particular place has been dealt with by the Supreme Court on number of occasions. For instance, in Patel Roadways Limited, v. M/s. Prasad Trading Company it was held that parties to contract cannot confer jurisdiction on Courts, which in fact do not have such jurisdiction. In the matter of corporate persons a slightly different approach was indicated. It was held that where a corporate person had a principal office at one place and a branch or subordinate office at different place, a suit can be maintained at both the places, notwithstanding the clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts at any particular place. Discussion was undertaken on similar and certain other aspects in Main Paul v; State of Haryana.

However, an important aspect to be noted is that in both the cases the question was as to whether the Courts in which the suits were instituted have territorial jurisdiction at all, particularly, in the context of clauses, conferring exclusive jurisdiction at named places, and from the point of view of transfer of proceedings on the ground of convenience.

8. In the instant case, the sequence of events and nature of transaction are such that the Courts at Visakhapatnam and Hyderabad can be said to be having territorial jurisdiction. The reason is that the Court at Hyderabad would have jurisdiction because tender forms were received, tenders were submitted and negotiations were held at Hyderabad. The tender notice as such, on the other hand, emanated from Visakhapatnam and