2006 Supreme(AP) 683
2006(2) L.S. 430
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE ANDHRA PRADESH : : AT HYDERABAD
Present:
The Hon’ble Mr.Justice
P.S. Narayana
City Restaurant, Stores
& Bakery, Business,Hyd., ..Petitioner
Vs.
The Commissioner, MCH,
Hyd., & Ors., ..Respondents
WP.No.12626/06 Date:26-6-2006
Mr.M. Basith Ali Yavar, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr.G. Rama Rao Ghanta, SC for MCH for RR 1 & 2.
Headnote:HYDERABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, Secs.146, 147, 2(28) & 2(39) - Petitioner filing writ petition seeking direction, declaring that proposed action of Corporation to demolish muligies, as highly illegal and arbitrary.
Contention that Corporation proposed to demolish muligies under occupation of Restaurant without notice to petitioner under road widening programme and without following due process of law which is contrary to Secs.146 & 147 of Act - M.C.H is bound to follow due process of law before proceeding with demolition activity - Respondent/Corporation directed not to take up any demolition activity relating to muligies under occupation of Restaurant unless and until they follow due process specified under provisions of Act.
Heard Sri Mohd. Basith Ali Yavar, the learned counsel representing the petitioner and Sri Ganta Rama Rao, learned standing counsel for Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad.
2. The writ petition is filed praying for a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the proposed action of the respondents 1 and 2 to demolish the mulgies 5 to 9 under the occupation of City Restaurant forming part of the property bearing Municipal No. 21-5-16, situated at Petlaburj, Hyderabad in collusion with respondent No.3 without notice to the petitioner under road widening programme and without following due process of law as highly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to Sections 146 and 147 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, (hereinafter in short referred to as ‘the Act’) and pass such other suitable orders.
3. Sri Ganta Rama Rao had taken notice representing the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad on 23-06-2006 and requested time to get instructions in the matter. This court while directing the office to list the matter on 26-6-2006 also made a further direction “In the meanwhile, the respondents not to proceed with the demolition activity relating to the subject matter of the writ petition if not already demolished”. The counsel representing the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad would submit that even if the petitioner is the tenant, the procedure may have to be followed. Sri Mohd. Basith Ali Yavar placed strong reliance in USHODAYA PUBLICATIONS, HYDERABAD VS. COMMISSIONER, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER(1). In view of the factual situation, the third respondent need not be heard at this stage, especially in the light of the fact that the petitioner is aggrieved by the action of the respondents 1 and 2 in not following the due process of law while operating the road widening programme. It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the petitioner is the partner and is well conversant with the facts of the case. It is also stated that respondents 1 and 2 are proposing to demolish mulgies 5 to 9 under occupation of City Restaurant forming part of the property bearing Municipal No.21-5-16 at Petlaburj, Hyderabad, in collusion with respondent No.3 without following due process of law under road widening programme. This court need not express any opinion relating to the said allegation.
4. Be that as it may, the Division Bench of this Court in Ushodaya Publications, Hyderabad Vs. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad,( 1 supra ) at Para 10 observed as hereunder:
“The 1st respondent is a statutory authority. Its right to take possession of the land, therefore, must be exercised within the four corners of the statute. It is one thing to say that the provisions laid down under the said Act for acquiring the land are not required to be taken recourse to as the owner thereof has granted consent but the same would not mean that the lessee’s consent need not be taken. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the said consent granted by the owner would not be binding upon the lessee and in that view of the matter the 1st respondent had no right to take forcible possession of the land in question, relying on the purported consent obtained by it from the petitioner’ lessor without taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as thereby the petitioner shall be deprived of its own valuable right. The Ist respondent in our considered opinion deprived the petitioner of the said right without taking recourse to law. K.Ramasway, J., in his order dated 14.9.1987 in writ petition No.6294 of 1983 held:
“ Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act read with the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, the Corporation has been given power to acquire the land for public purpose by issue of notice under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, unless the parties give consent to the acquisition. In this case, in view of the above fac