( 1 ) LEAVE granted.

( 2 ) DECEASED Shivnandan Prasad Shukla was travelling in a Tempo Trax for going to Allahabad from Bhopal. It collided with a truck. Registration number of truck could not be noticed. The truck also could not be traced. A First Information Report was lodged by one of the occupants of the tempo Trax. An investigation on the basis of the said First Information report for commission of an offence under Section 304-A of the Indian penal Code was registered against the driver of the said truck. As during investigation the truck could not be traced out, the case was closed. A Claim petition was filed before the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal against the driver, owner and the Insurance Company with which the Tempo trax was insured. The Tribunal upon analyzing the materials brought on record by the parties, including the First Information Report, arrived at a finding of fact that the driver of the Tempo Trax was not driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. It, therefore, dismissed the claim petition opining:

"16. On the basis of the above discussions, I come to this conclusion that the applicants on the basis of the discussions in issue No. 1, have failed to prove that the accident dated 23rd January, 2001 was caused by rash and negligent driving of tempo trax No. MP-04- h-5525. In these circumstances the driver and insurance company of tempo trax No. MP-04-H-5525 cannot be held responsible for the accident. As a result, the present claim petition is dismissed. "

( 3 ) IN support of its finding, the decision of this Court in Kaushnuma begum and Ors. v New India Assurance [2001 ACJ 428 : (2001) 2 SCC 9] which was relied upon by both the parties was referred to wherein it was held:

"18. Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 1861-73 ALL ER 1, can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the Rule in claims for

compensation made in respect of motor accidents. 19. 'no fault liability' envisaged in section 140 of the MV Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permit that compensation paid under 'no fault liability' can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from section 140 of the MV Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them.

( 4 ) CLAIMANTS being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said Award preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court principally relying on the depositions of depositions of Shri R. K. Sharma and Smt. Premlata Shukla, wherein allegations were made that the tempo trax was driven in a rash and negligent manner, opined that the First Information report having been legally not proved, the driver of the Tempo Trax should be held to be guilty of driving rashly and negligently.

( 5 ) IT is to be noted that in the claim petition itself a reference was made to the lodging of the First Information Report.

( 6 ) THE learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that as the respondents themselves relied on the First Information report, the High Court could not h