This Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff in O.S.No.7 of 1982 on the file of the District Munsiff, Narsapur. The respondent is the defendant in the suit. The plaintiff filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men from interfering with the lane between the houses of the plaintiff and the defendant and to grant mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the eves of his tiled house extended to the lane.

2. The defendant contended that the disputed land is his exclusive lane and the plaintiff has no manner of right over the same. He further contended that there is used to be a thatched house by the time of his purchasing the house and after obtaining permission from the municipality, he constructed a tiled house in the same place at which the thatched house used to exist and as the lane exclusively belongs to him, the plaintiff has no right to ask for any relief against the defendant. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

3. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. After perusal of the same, the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief as prayed for. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred A.S.No.6 of 1992 on the file of the Subordinate Judge at Narsapur and the appeal was also dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred the present appeal.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff contends that the appellate Court while disposing of the appeal failed to frame appropriate points for consideration and also failed to discuss the evidence adduced by both parties and that the grounds raised by the appellant are not answered by the appellate Court. He further contends that the appellate Court did not take into consideration the failure of the defendant to file a mediators report that there is no discussion regarding the reliefs sought for and that the defendant failed to file the sale deed through which he purchased the property. He further contends that no document was filed by the defendant to show that the municipality granted permission for construction of wall at the house and that the appellate Court failed to follow Order 41, Rule 31 of C.P.C. in writing the judgment. Therefore, the learned counsel requested to allow the appeal and remand the matter to the appellate Court for disposal after considering the above points, after giving opportunity to both parties.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhukar and others v. Sangram and others1 wherein it was held that it is the duty of the first appellate Court to deal with all issues and evidence led by parties before recording any finding and as the judgment rendered by the first appellate Court is hopelessly falling short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court are liable to be set aside and accordingly, remanded the first appeal to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

6. In Gorrella Durga Vara Prasada Rao v. Indukuri Ram Raju and others, a Division Bench of this Court while considering the scope of Order 41, Rule 31 of C.P.C. held that even without framing specific points for determination, if the appellate Court in its judgment deals with all grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal and gives decision on those grounds with reasons, amounts to sufficient compliance with order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. The Division Bench of this Court while answering the reference whether Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. is mandatory, gave the above judgment.

7. For proper adjudication, it is appropriate to extract Order 41, Rule 31 C.P.C., which reads as follows: "Contents, date and signature of judgment - the judgment of the appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state - (a) the points for d