1. K.Ravichandra Reddy and 16 others filed the present Writ Petition for a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings of the 1st respondent in G.O.Rt.No.1515, dt.16-7-2007 as illegal, null, void and opposed to Section 19(e) of Act 30 of 1987 insofar as it relates to 6th respondent herein and pass such other suitable orders. The 6th respondent is one M.Jagannadha Reddy.

2. This Court issued rule nisi on 6-8-2007 and granted interim order for a limited period in W.P.M.P.No.21166/2007 and subsequent thereto on 21-8-2007 the interim order granted earlier was extended until further orders.

3. The 4th respondent - Sri Swayambu Sri Varasiddhi Vinayaka Swamy Temple, Kanipakam, filed W.V.M.P.No.2308/2007 to vacate the interim order. Likewise, the 6th respondent filed W.V.M.P.No.2077/2007 to vacate the interim order. Counter affidavits are filed by R.1, R.2 and a common reply affidavit also was filed by the writ petitioners.

4. The learned Counsel on record made elaborate submissions and at the request of the Counsel, the Writ Petition itself had been taken up for final hearing.

5. Contentions of Sri M.S.Prasad:- Sri M.S.Prasad, the learned Counsel representing the writ petitioners had taken this Court through G.O.Rt.No.1515, dt.16-7-2007 and would maintain that the said impugned order issued by the 1st respondent so far as it relates to the 6th respondent is concerned, being opposed to Section 19(1)(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter, in short, would be referred to 'the Act' for the purpose of convenience) is invalid. The Counsel also would maintain that inspite of the representation made by petitioners 2 and 17 by furnishing the various Judgments showing the conviction and confirmation thereof of the 6th respondent and despite the fact that the said offence is an offence involving moral turpitude, the 1st respondent proceeded to issue the impugned G.O., and hence the same cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel made elaborate submissions on the aspect of the scope, ambit and definition of the expression "moral turpitude" and also further had taken this Court through the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and would maintain that an offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship would definitely be an offence involving moral turpitude and hence the Writ Petition to be allowed. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the counter affidavits filed by R.1 and R.2 would go to show that despite the fact that the 6th respondent incurs disqualification, somehow or other, the official respondents are interested to see that the 6th respondent is continued instead of taking appropriate steps in this regard to rectify the grave illegality committed by them. The learned Counsel also would comment that even without verifying the antecedents properly, the concerned authorities had further proceeded with the matter. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through Sections 18, 19 and 28 of the Act and would comment that inasmuch as rule nisi had been issued, the question of driving the writ petitioners to an alternative remedy normally would not arise. Even otherwise, the learned Counsel would maintain that this is not a case of subsequent disqualification after appointment, but a disqualification which was incurred by the 6th respondent long prior to the appointment and which, in fact, was brought to the notice of the concerned authorities inclusive of the Minister concerned by making due representations. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the contents of the representations in this regard. The learned Counsel also would maintain that instead of giving an effect to the Legislative intent, the authorities are trying to explain the situation so as to convince this Court that the rigor of the offence with which R.6 had been charged in a way had been watered down by the Apex Court. This approach adopted cannot be sustained.