Andhra Pradesh High Court
VIMADALAL,GANGADHARA RAO
Kappara Venkatasesha Lalitamma - Appellant
Versus
Kappara Kotayya - Respondent
Decided On : 07/16/1976
LIMITATION ACT - ARTICLE 125 - APPLICABILITY - HINDU FEMALE IN POSSESSION OF PROPERTY UNDER FAMILY ARRANGEMENT - ARTICLE 125 NOT APPLICABLE - RESIDUARY ARTICLE 120 APPLICABLE - SUIT BARRED BY LIMITATION.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, the wife of Ramakrishnaiah, filed a suit for a declaration that the alienation made by the first defendant, the widow of Raghavaiah, in favor of Defendants 2 to 4 under Exts. A-4, A-5, and A-6 on 21st April, 1952, did not bind the plaintiff after the lifetime of the first defendant. The first defendant contended that she got into possession of the properties under a family arrangement dated 17th December, 1928, under which only a life estate was conferred upon her.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the first defendant got into possession of the B Schedule properties not as a Hindu female but only under the family arrangement and so Article 125 of the Limitation Act was not applicable but it was only the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act that was applicable to the suit.
Issues: Whether Article 125 or Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 is applicable to the facts of the case.
Ratio Decidendi: Article 125 of the Limitation Act applies when the possession is that of a Hindu or a Muhammadan female as such, that is to say, by virtue of her being a Hindu or Muhammadan and does not apply if her possession is by virtue of a grant or transfer made inter vivos or by virtue of a bequest, or, in other words, when her possession is irrespective of her being a Hindu or Muhammadan female.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and held that the suit was barred by limitation.
GANGADHARA RAO, J. :- This letters Patent Appeal has come up before us on leave granted by Ramachandra Rao, J., in Second Appeal No. 325 of 1973. Is Article 125 or Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 applicable to the facts of the case? That is the question we have to decide in this appeal.
2. In order to appreciate this question it is necessary to state a few facts. The plaintiff is the appellant in this appeal. She is the wife of Ramakrishnaiah. His father Narayana and the first defendant's husband late Raghavaiah were the sons of one Ramakrishnaiah. It is the case of the plaintiff that her father-in-law Narayana died undivided from his brother Raghavaiah in about 1915 or 1916 and thereafter the plaintiff's husband Ramakrishnaiah and Raghavaiah continued to enjoy the family properties jointly till the year 1928 when Raghavaiah also died leaving behind his widow, the first defendant, so her husband got the properties by survivorship. The first defendant was a minor by the date of the death of her husband and on her behalf her father set up a claim to the properties. Then a family arrangement was arrived at, which is evidenced by Ex. A-1 dated 17th December, 1928. Under that arrangement plaint A Schedule properties were allotted to Ramakrishnaiah with absolute rights and the B Schedule properties were allotted to the first defendant for enjoyment during her lifetime. The plaintiff's husband died on 11th June, 1940, intestate and without any issue. Thereafter the first defendant settled the first item of the plaint schedule properties on the second defendant on 21st April, 1952, under Ext. A-4. She also alienated Items 2 and 3 in favor of the defendants 3 and 4 under the sale deeds Exts. A-5 and A-6 dated 21st April, 1952, respectively. The 3rd defendant in his turn sold the second item to the 5th defendant. The 5th defendant died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record as defendants 6 to 9. The 7th defendant was alleged to be in possession of the said item. On 12th April, 1961, the plaintiff has filed the suit for a declaration that the alienation made by the first defendant in favour of Defendants 2 to 4 under Exts. A-4, A-5 and A-6 on 21st April, 1952, did not bind the plaintiff after the lifetime of the first defendant.
3. The first defendant contended that her father-in-law Narayana became divided about ten years before his death from his brother Raghavaiah and, therefore, the plaintiff's father-in-law did not get the properties by survivorship. She denied knowledge of the family arrangement dated 17th December, 1928. She further stated that her husband Raghavaiah executed a will on 18th February, 1928, giving away the entire propertiesn covered by B Schedule to her with absolute rights. Thus she claimed that she became absolutely entitled to the properties both by virtue of the will of Raghavaiah and also under the Hindu Succession Act. She also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. Defendants 5 to 7 raised similar pleas.
4. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence on record held that the first defendant's husband died intestate while he was a joint coparcener with the husband of the plaintiff, that the family arrangement evidenced by Ext. A-1 dated 17th December, 1928 was true and binding on the first defendant, that the will set up by the first defendant was not true, that the suit was not barred by limitation and that the alienations made by the first defendant would not be binding on the plaintiff beyond the lifetime of the first defendant. In the result, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff.
5. Against that decree the defendants 2 and 4 preferred an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Prakasam District. The learned Judge found that the family arrangement dated 17th December, 1928, was valid and binding on the first defendant and that the will dated 18th February, 1928, was not true. On the question of limitation h
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