Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act permits a plaintiff to deduct the whole of the time occupied in pursuing remedies which proved to be fruitless for reasons of defects of jurisdiction or of the like nature in calculating the limitation for the purpose of a suit to annul the order forming the subject-matter of that suit.

CHANDRA REDDY, C.J. :- The question to be answered by the Full Bench is formulated in these words :

"Whether the consistent view as hold in Venkatragayya Appa Row v. Sriramulu 17 Ind Cas 593 (Mad); Baiznath Lala v. Ramadoss, ILR 39 Mad 62 : (AIR 1915 Mad 405) and Alagappa Chettiar v. Somasundaram Chettiar, 1937 Mad WN 465 (2) that only the pendency of the infructuous revision should be excluded under S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act, requires re-consideration in view or Rule 41-A(2) of the Appellate Side Rules prescribing the period of 90 days for civil revision petitions, or for any other reason, so as to exclude the entire period from the date of the adverse order to the date of disposal of the infructuous revision under the said provision of the Limitation Act."

2. For an appraisal of the issue that presents itself before us, it is necessary to recall a few material facts. The Rajah of Vizianagaram obtained a decree in S.C.S. No. 1098 of 1938 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Visakhapatnam, against one Hanumanthu, husband of the second respondent and the father of the third respondent herein. In execution of this decree, he brought the properties, the subject-matter of this litigation, to sale and purchased them himself in the beginning of the year 1949. Subsequently, a sale-certificate was issued on 21-7-1949. After the abolition of the estate under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, the Government in whom the whole of the estate vested under Section 3(b) of the Act obtained delivery of possession of those properties.

3. The appellants herein filed au application under O. 21, Rules 100 and 101 C.P.C. claiming the properties as their own and seeking to dispossess the Government as representing the decree-holder-auction-purchaser. This application was rejected by the executing Court on 9-7-1953. Instead of having recourse to Order 21 Rule 103 C.P.C., the appellants filed a civil revision petition (C. R. P. No. 1863 of 1953) to the High Court of Judicature at Madras on 23-9-1953. This petition was dismissed on 18-10-1955 by the High Court presumably for the reason that it did not involve any question relating to jurisdiction within the connotation of Section 115, C.P.C.

4. This led the appellants to lay an action to set aside the adverse order dated 9-7-1953. The plaint was presented on 15-10-1956. Since the suit was instituted, more than one year from the date of the impugned order as prescribed by Article 11-A of the Indian Limitation Act, Section 14 of that Act was invoked by the plaintiffs-appellants.

5. The defendants pleaded that Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act enabled the plaintiffs to deduct only the period between the date of the filing of the civil revision petition and the disposal thereof, i.e., from 23-9-1953 to 18-10-1955.

6. This defence prevailed with the Courts below with the result that although they found that the appellants had established their title to the properties in question the suit was dismissed as it was not brought within one year, (excluding the period of pendency of the civil revision petition).

7. The aggrieved plaintiffs brought a second appeal to this Court which originally was heard by Manohar Pershad, J., who, having regard to the conflict of judicial opinion, referred it to a Division Bench of this Court.

8. Subsequently, the second appeal came up before Jaganmohan Reddy, J. and one of us (Narasimham, J.) who, after discussing the case-law bearing on the subject referred the question formulated above for the opinion of a Full Bench of this Court.

9. Since the decision in this appeal turns entirely on Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, it will be conveniently read here. Section 14 (omitting the unnecessary portions) recites :

''(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of fir