1. This revision petition is filed against so-called remand Judgment dated 28.06.2010 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Prakasam, Ongole setting aside order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kanigiri in C.C.No.57 of 2003 directing the trial court for fresh disposal according to law, after framing separate charges against A-4 and A-5 instead of combined charge and permitting both the parties to lead further evidence if any.

2. In the trial court, A-1 to A-3 faced charges under Sections 406, 420, 471 and 120-B IPC and A-4 and A-5 faced charge under Section 468 IPC. It is alleged that A-1 to A-3 borrowed loan from Prakasam District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Pambru to establish bricks units on the strength of fabricated pattadar pass book and fabricated title deed books Exs.P-6, P-12, P-13, P-29, P-30 and P-42 inspite of A-1 to A-3 not having any rights in the lands shown in those books and that A-4 as person in-charge of the bank gave ‘no dues certificates’ to A-1 to A-3 inspite of they being defaulters in Kodigumpala branch and that A-5 as Village Administrative Officer helped A-1 to A-3 in creating false Adangals, Pattadar Pass books and title deed books. After full trial, in which P.Ws.1 to 8 were examined and Exs.P-1 to P-43 were marked for the prosecution, the trial court found A-1 to A-5 not guilty of the charges and acquitted them.

3. In the appeal, the lower appellate court commented the trial court as follows:

“Somehow, while analyzing the material before it, the lower court failed to focus its attention regarding the right of A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the lands mentioned in the Pattadar Passbooks and Title deed books submitted by them to the bank for availing loan amounts and consequently, the lower court failed to record any finding on this aspect.”

The lower appellate court further observed:

“There is also no sound reasoning for the acquittal of A.4 and A.5 and charge No.3

should not have been framed as a single charge against A.4 and A.5 and specific charges should have been framed separately against both A.4 and A.5.”

For the above reasons, the lower appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for fresh disposal according to law in the light of the above observations and after giving opportunity to both the parties to lead further evidence, if any.

4. This Court is of the opinion that the lower appellate court, though quoted Section 386

(a) Cr.P.C, failed to understand the scope thereof. Section 386(a) Cr.P.C reads as follows:

“386. Powers of the Appellate Court.--------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law;”

As per the above provision, three options are open for the appellate court in an appeal from an order of acquittal, in case the appellate court intended to reverse the order of acquittal; and they are a) direct that further enquiry be made, or b) that the accused be re-tried, or c) to find the accused guilty and pass sentence on him according to law. In so far as the 4th option of committing the case for trial is concerned, such contingency arises only in case the lower appellate court finds that the offence in respect of which the accused shall be tried is a graver one which is exclusively triable by a court of Session and not by a Magistrate. This case has no such proportion of committing the same to the court of Session for trial.

5. In so far as Option-(a) i.e. directing further enquiry is concerned, it does not arise in the present case as this is a trial case and not an enquiry case before the Magistrate. Section 2(g) Cr.P.C defines ‘inquiry’ and it reads as follows:

“(g) “inquiry” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court;”

Thus, inquir