At the interlocutory stage, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner is a Mutually Aided Cooperative Society registered under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act’). Seven of the Managing Committee Members and 46 members of the petitioner-Society have filed petitions, dated 18.06.2009 and 02.07.2009, to respondent No.1 with the grievance that the Chairman of the petitioner-Society has not been holding elections. Respondent No.1 obviously finding certain alleged lapses on the part of the management has ordered for an inquiry to be held into the affairs of the petitioner-Society.

It is not in dispute that the inquiry was completed by the Inquiry Officer and a report was submitted to respondent No.1 on 16.10.2009. Thereafter, respondent No.1 issued notice, dated 02.02.2010, whereby he has directed the petitioner to convene General Body Meeting on 19.02.2010, to discuss various lapses allegedly committed by the Chairman of the petitioner-Society. This notice is assailed in this writ petition.

An application for impleadment of five of the members of the petitioner-Society was filed. The said application has been ordered by a separate order. Respondent No.1, apart from filing counter affidavit, has filed a vacate stay application. When these applications came up for hearing, the writ petition itself is taken up for hearing.

At the hearing, Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that a copy of the inquiry report was not sent to the Society within one month of submission of report by the Inquiry Officer as envisaged under Section 29(5) of the Act and that therefore, the impugned notice is vitiated. The learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.1 has exceeded his jurisdiction by directing that notices shall be issued for the proposed General Body Meeting even to the persons who were members at the time of registration of the Society, but ceased to be so thereafter.

The learned Government Pleader for Cooperation, while reiterating the averments contained in the counter affidavit, has stated that respondent No.1 has not supplied the inquiry report within the time stipulated and that on 28.01.2009, the Chairman was asked to pay Rs.226/- as charges towards supply of report and that even though the said payment has not been made, the report was nevertheless supplied to the Chairman.

As regards the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, under subsection (5) of Section 29 of the Act, the Registrar shall communicate the report of the inquiry inter alia to the Cooperative Society concerned within a period of 30 days from the date of completion of the inquiry. Concededly, in the instant case, the inquiry report was not communicated within the stipulated time.

The question, therefore, is whether non-furnishing of the inquiry report leads to lapse of the whole inquiry proceedings?

No doubt, this Court is conscious of the phrase ‘shall’ in sub-section (5) of Section 29 of the Act. However, the settled legal position regarding interpretation of statute is that the use of word ‘shall’ raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative, but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction [State of Uttar Pradesh v. Monbodhan Lal Srivastava (AIR 1957 SC 912), State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya (AIR 1961 SC 751). In M/s.Sainik Motors, Jodhpur and others v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1961 SC 1480), the Supreme Court held that the word ‘shall’ is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands.

A careful analysis of Section 29(5) of the Act would disclose that it has not provided the consequence that the proceedings lapse for non-sup