Taking specimen handwriting and finger impressions of the accused does not amount to testimonial compulsion violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

This is a petition by the accused to revise the order made by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gooty, in Crl.M.P. No. 751/70 directing the accused to give specimen handwriting to the Investigating Officer in Crime No. 167/70 of the Gooty Police Station.

2. Mr. Sadasiva Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that directing the accused to give his specimen signatures for the purpose of investigating an offence alleged to have committed, amounts to testimonial compulsion offending Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (Jagannadhadas J.), AIR 1954 SC 300 observed that : "Article 20(3) embodies the principles or protection against compulsion of self-incrimination which is one of the fundamental canons of the British system of criminal jurisprudence and which has been adopted by the American system and incorporated as an article of its Constitution. It has also, to a substantial extent, been recognised in the Anglo-Indian administration of criminal justice in this country by incorporation into various statutory provisions.

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So far as the Indian law is concerned, it may be taken that the protection against self-incrimination continues more or less as in the English common law, so far as the accused and production of documents are concerned, but that it has been modified as regards oral testimony of witnesses, by introducing compulsion and providing immunity from prosecution on the basis of such compelled evidence.

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Analysing the terms in which this fundamental right has been declared in our Constitution, it may be said to consist of the following components :

(1) It is a right, pertaining to a person "accused of an offence," (2) It is a protection against "compulsion to be a witness," and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence "Against himself."

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Broadly stated the guarantee in Article 20(3) is against "testimonial compulsion". But there is no reason to confine it to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the witness-stand. The protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase "to be a witness" is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available, therefore, to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution.

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Considered in this light, the guarantee under Art. 20(3) would be available to persons against whom a First Information Report has been recorded as accused therein. It would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against them."

Dealing with the specific question, where thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm, fingers or specimen writings of the accused are taken, are not included in the expression "to be a witness," their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a Majority Judgment in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu (Sinha C.J.) 1961-2 Cri.L.J. 856 = (AIR 1961 SC 1808) held -

"'To be a witness' is not equivalent to 'furnishing evidence' in its widest significance that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statements but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The observation of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 300 that Section 139 of the Evidence Act has no bearing on the connotation of the word 'witness' is not entirely well founded in law."

It was further held :

"An accused person furnishes evidence when he is giving specimen handwriting, or impressions of his fingers or palm or foot but