JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.

This is a petition for the issue of an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution directing the Sales Tax Commissioner not to collect tax on (a) double roti, parata and shirmal, (b) on cooked rice and (c) milk, milk products and (d) fresh eggs. The Advocate for the petitioner confines his case to the first two items only as it is said that the Sales Tax Commissioner has accepted the exemptions of items Nos. (c) and (d). Even with respect to item No. 1, it appears from the return make by the assessee which is shown to us by the learned Advocate for the Commissioner that exemption has only been claimed with respect to double roti, shirmal and tanure-ki-roti, but parata has not been shown in the statement. The exemption claimed is under item 3, i.e., "bread", and item 1, i.e., "all cereals and pulses including all forms of rice (except when sold in sealed containers)" of Schedule 1 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act (XIV of 1950).

The first question that falls for determination is whether double roti, shirmal, parata and chapathi etc., can be called bread. The learned Advocate for the respondent states that except for double roti, the other articles are not covered by the term bread. He contends that bread which is the same as "double roti" is prepared in the manner described in the Webster's International Dictionary, that is, it is an article of food made by baking the dough which is treated in some way to render it light or porus, as by mixing it with yeast or leaven or baking powder. We are unable to accept this contention nor are we prepared to presume that the Legislature intended by the use of the word "bread" in item 3 of Schedule I to exempt only that article of food which is prepared in European countries in the manner described in the dictionary. On the other hand, a reference to the Oxford Dictionary would show that in all European languages bread originally meant "piece", "bit", "fragment (frustum)", which later has passed through the senses of "piece of bread", "broken bread", into that of "bread" as a substance; while at the same time the original word for "bread, loaf, panis" has been restricted to undivided article as shaped and baked, the "loaf". When the Legislature uses a term relating to any article of food, we must construe it in the sense in which it is understood in this country and not elsewhere. In fact bread which is commonly labelled as a loaf of bread in European countries has a particular name in this country and is called a "double roti" thereby distinguishing it from ordinary "roti" which is synonymous with a loaf of bread. In this country, it is not unusual for a descriptive prefix to connote the kind of bread such as "Jawari-ki-roti, Bajre-ki-roti, Makai-ki-roti", Gheon-ki-roti" etc. In our view the intention of the Legislature is to include all kinds of bread which are consumed by the citizens of India, whether prepared in different ways or called by different names. There is no justification for limiting the scope of the term bread to a particular kind, such as "double roti" as contended by the learned Advocate for the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The intention of the Legislature is further made clear in the amended Schedule I which was substituted by Act XXVIII of 1952, where the term "bread" in item 3 thereof includes "double roti, chapathi, kulcha and shirmal". This inclusive definition of the word "bread" negatives the contention of the learned Advocate that by "bread" is only meant "double roti", and no other kind of roti. If his contention was right, there was nothing to prevent the word "double roti" for the word "bread" nor can we justifiably infer that the exemption is only meant for the very limited class of citizens who consume "double roti" while levying the tax on vast majority of citizens who do not consume that article of food. We are, therefore, not impressed by the contention that articles for which exemption is claimed were not includ