A land-holder who purchases lands from a ryot after 1st July 1945 is not entitled to a ryotwari patta under S. 12 (b) (ii) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 unless he has been in direct and continuous possession of the lands from that date.

SUBBA RAO, C.J. : This is an appeal against the judgment of our learned brother Satyanarayana Raju, J., dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The facts that gave rise to the appeal may be briefly stated. The village of Narasapuram in Tiruvur taluk was notified as a zamindari estate under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with effect from 7th September 1950. The petitioner, who is the land-holder of the said village, filed an application under Ss. 12 and 15 (1) of the said Act for the issue of a ryotwari patta in respect of certain dry lands bearing S. Nos. 219/9 and 347 of the extent of 58 cents and 1 acre 76 cents respectively. The said two items were purchased by him from ryots in March 1947. The Settlement Officer and, on appeal, the Estates Abolition Tribunal, held that, as the said items were purchased subsequent to 1st July 1945, the petitioner was not entitled to have a patta under S. 12 (b) (ii) of the Act. Satyanarayana Raju, J., who heard the Writ Petition, agreed with them in their conclusion. The first question raised before us is that the conclusion of the learned Judge on the interpretation of S. 12 (b) is wrong. Section 12 reads :

"In the case of a zamindari estate, the land-holder shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a roytwari patta in respect of -

(b) (i) all lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included, in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the land-holder, by inheritance or succession under a Will, provided that the land-holder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry from the date of such acquisition or the 1st day of July 1939, whichever is later and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from such later date;

(ii) all lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included, in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the land-holder by purchase, exchange or gift, but not including purchase at a sale for arrears of rent, provided that the land-holder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry from the 1st day of July 1945, and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date."

Clause (ii) of sub-s. (b) is invoked in the present case. It is argued that, under the main limb of the clause, a land-holder who purchases lands from a ryot at any time before the Act otherwise than in a sale for arrears of rent is entitled to have a ryotwari patta in respect of that land and that the proviso will apply to a similar purchase made by him before 1st July 1945. In other words, if a land-holder purchases lands from a ryot after 1st July 1945, it is not a necessary condition that he should have been in direct and continuous possession of the lands from, that date. This construction, if accepted, would lead to the anomaly that land-holder purchaser after 1st July 1945, need not be in possession of the land, whereas a land-holder purchaser of an earlier date before he is entitled to a ryotwari patta is subject to an additional condition that he should have been in possession from 1st July 1945. The contention which leads to this unexpected and unjust result cannot be accepted unless the express terms of the clause compels us to do so.

3. In support of the contention, learned counsel relied upon the rule of construction laid down in Cortis v. The Kent Water Works Company, (1827) 108 ER 741 (A). There the question was whether corporations were liable to contribute to poor rate. That question fell to be considered on a construction of the terms of the 16th section of 47, George, Ch. 3, III. By the 16th section the Commissioner