The consent of the junior widow is not necessary for the validity of an adoption by a senior widow, as the doctrine of consent in Hindu law is based on the presumed incapacity of women to act independently, rather than on the idea of any interference with the proprietary rights of the sapindas.

SUBBA RAO, C.J. :- This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the Judgment of our learned brother Viswanatha Sastri, J.

2. The facts are not in dispute. One Kanchi Veeraraghava Reddi died leaving two widows Ammayamma and Varadamma. The senior widow Ammayamma with the consent of her husbands divided brothers, adopted the plaintiff on 12th March, 1944. Apprehending that the junior widow and one of the brothers of late Veeraraghava Reddi would raise disputes questioning the validity of the adoption, the plaintiff filed O. S. No. 9 of 1945 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Chittoor, for a declaration that he was the validly adopted son of Veeraraghava Reddi and for possession of the properties.

3. Defendants 1 to 4 are the divided brothers of Veeraraghava Reddi. The 5th defendant is the junior widow of Veeraraghava Reddi and defendants 6 and 7 are her daughters. Various defences were raised to the suit questioning the validity and factum of the adoption.

4. The District Munsif and on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge upheld the factum and validity of the adoption. The 5th deft. preferred a S. A. to the High Court which was disposed of by Viswanatha Sastri, J. The only point raised in the Second Appeal was that the adoption was not valid inasmuch as the senior widow took the plaintiff in adoption without the consent of the junior widow. The learned Judge held that as the adoption was made with consent of the nearest male sapindas, it was valid, though the consent of the Junior widow was not taken. In the Letters Patent Appeal the same contention was raised.

5. The only question therefore is whether the adoption made by a senior widow with the consent of the nearest male sapindas but without the consent of the Junior widow is valid. The answer depends upon the principle underlying the doctrine of consent. It is settled law in this State that a widow can take a boy in adoption with the consent of the nearest sapindas of her husband. It is also settled that there should be such evidence of the assent of kinsmen or sapindas as suffices to show that the act was done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither, capriciously nor form a corrupt motive. This doctrine had not its origin in any specific Hindu Law text but a remote connection may be discovered in the state of the perpetual tutelage assigned to woman under Hindu Law expressed so tersely and clearly in the well-known text of Yajnavalkya in Chapter I, verse 85 :

Let her father protect a maiden; her husband a married woman; sons in old age; if none of these other gnatis (kinsmen); she is not fit for independence."

6. In what is called popularly the Ramnad Case, Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy, 12 Moo Ind App. 397 (PC) (A) their Lordships based their decision on the presumed! incapacity of women for independence. Their Lordships stated :

The assent of the kinsmen seems to be required by reason of the presumed incapacity of women for independence, rather than the necessity of procuring the consent of all those whose possible and reversionary interest in the estate would be defeated by the adoption".

7. In Ramasubbayya v. Chenchuramayya ILR (1948) Mad 362 : (AIR 1947 PC 124) (B).

"the need for consent arises because of the presumed incapacity of women for independence."

8. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sundara Ramarao v. Satyanarayana Murthi, ILR (1950) Mad 461: (AIR 1950 Mad 74) (C), had occasion to trace the doctrine of consent in some detail. At p. 485 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 82 of AIR), Viswanatha Sastri, J., observed :

"The root of the matter is that the permission of the husband, or in its absence, the assent of his father or other gnatis was required for an adoption by the widow by reason only of her dependence, adoption being in itself a meritorious act.

9. At p. 487 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 83 of AIR), the learned Judge proceeded to state :

"In short, the Board reiterated the view that the asse