The Suits Against Government Act was not discriminatory and it was reasonable to continue the Act after the inauguration of the Constitution.

MOHAMMED AHMED ANSARI, J. :-

This appeal by the plaintiff is against the order of the Chief Judge, Hyderabad City Civil Court, rejecting the plaint because of the absence of the permission to sue under the Suits Against the Government Act. The aforesaid order is dated January, 5, 1951, i.e., before the extension of the Civil Procedure Code to Part B States and the claim relates to a period prior to the inauguration of the Constitution. The appellant has claimed Rs. 10,000/-from the State on account of an alleged breach of a contract which he states to have entered into, because the Naib-Nazim of the Excise Department had publicly undertaken that the licence for toddy and liquor for the Fasli Year 1359 (1949-50), would be with the concession of three months period for depositing money.

The appellant further alleges that he took the shop at Saeedabad on the aforesaid undertaking and in view of the toddy shop at Annaram having been wound up and amalgamated with the shop at Sarurnagar, which was at some distance from the shop he had taken at the auction; but in breach of the undertaking the shop at Sarurnagar was brought to Gaddi Annaram which is a new site and is very near to the shop at Saeedabad; that this transfer adversely affected the sale of drinks from the appellants shop and was with a view to confer benefit on a friend of the Naib-Nazim; that it had caused loss and the concession for depositing money was also broken by demanding deposits earlier; and that the shop was re-auctioned, whereas according to the proclamation he could deposit the amount till the end of Bahman 1359 F. (December, 1949). On the aforesaid grounds, the appellant claimed damages.

2. The alleged breach of the contract obviously has taken place some time in December, 1949, because it is stated in paragraph 7 of the plaint that on Bahman 10, 1359 F. (December, 10, 1949) the appellant was dispossessed of the shop without notice and when he complained to the Department he was informed about the shop being re-auctioned on account of his failure to pay the deposit, whereof he filed an application on Bahman 26, 1359 F. (December 26, 1949). In view of such clear allegations, we do not accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the breach of the contract took place on February 26, 1950, because his client was served on the aforesaid day with a notice of January 24, 1950, demanding from him the deficit in the amount caused by the re-auction. According to the appellant the contract having been concluded with the undertakings, the bidders would be allowed three months for making the necessary deposits, the date on which the undertakings were broken is obviously the date on which the breach took place and on which the appellant would become entitled to claim damages. Here is, therefore, in this case a breach before the inauguration of the Constitution.

3. There was in the then Hyderabad State an enactment called Suits Against Government Act, under which no suit could be filed against the then Government without permission which was obtained in the manner specified in the Act. Section 3 of the Act expressly prohibited institution of the Suits and the subsequent Sections provided for filing an application in the form of a plaint before the then Legal Adviser, who after hearing the parties would make recommendations and the Government would either give permission to file the suit or withhold it.

In case the permission be granted, the party would get back his application with the endorsement and could file the suit in the Court in which ordinarily such a suit lay. That is the substance of the several provisions in the Act, which was not repealed till 1955. As the judgment rejecting the plaint is dated January, 5, 1951, we are not called upon to determine any question of repugnancy between the Act and the Civil Procedure Code, which was extended to Part-B states only in April 1951. The counsel of the appellant, in these circumstances, has urg