S. 65 and 72 of the Contract Act are not applicable to a contract which is performed by both parties and for aught we know the plaintiff by selling the goods would have made large profits owing to the fluctuations in prices.

ORDER : These two petitions raise the question whether a Court can entertain an application under S. 68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, not filed within 21 days from the date of the sale h«ld by the Official Receiver. The sale now sought to be impugned was held on 21-12-1949. One of the creditors filed a petition on 23-1-1950 for setting aside the sale on the ground that it did not fetch proper price.

Pending that petition, the insolvent i.e., the present petitioner wanted to come on record on the allegation that the creditor was withdrawing the petition in collusion with the purchaser. This petition as well as the petition filed by the creditor were rejected on the ground that the latter was barred under the proviso to S. 68 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which recites that no application under this Section shall be entertained after the expiration of 21 days from the date of the Act or the decision complained of. This having proved unsuccessful, the insolvent has brought these two revision petitions.

2. It is urged by Mr. Ramamurthy for Mr. Rama Rao, that a Court is not precluded from entertaining an application notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the time prescribed by the proviso. In support of this proposition, reliance is placed on Data Ram v. Deoki Nandan, ILR 1 Lah 307 : (AIR 1620 Lah 361) (A) where it was ruled that when it came to the knowledge of the Court that the action of the receiver in any particular respect wag open to objection the Court had inherent discretion to rectify the Receivers errors or mistakes, or to reverse or modify his acts or decisions and from this view-point it would be immaterial if the Court acted upon information supplied by persons who were outside the scope of Section 22 of the Act; and in such a case the time limit prescribed by S. 22 would be no bar to action being taken by Court.

3. It may be pointed out that section 22 of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907, is reproduced in Section 68 of the present Act. No doubt, this judgment renders some assistance to the petitioner. But, this is in the teeth of the Section which lays down that an application filed after 21 days should not be entertained. This is a mandatory provision which requires the acts of the Receiver to be questioned with 21 clays. Such being the case, there is no inherent power in a Court to receive a petition filed after the lapse of 21 days. If authority is needed it is found in Jaikishan v. Chiragh Din, AIR 1935 Lah 60 (B).

4.Section 5 of the Limitation Act, cannot be extended to such applications as it is not applicable to those applications. Vide Thakur Prasad v. Panno Lal, ILR 35 All 410 (G). It follows that the inherent powers of the Court could not be invoked when the application is barred under the Proviso to S. 68. Even assuming such powers exist in a Court, this is not a proper case in which it can be exercised having regard to the fact that the petitioner had not chosen to impugn the sales for eight months which clearly signifies that it is merely an afterthought. There are absolutely no merits in these petitions and they are dismissed with costs in C. R. P. No. 248 of 1954.

Petitions dismissed.

34. Nor can we agree with the argument that the subsequent addition to the schedule retrospectively continued the legal force of the preexisting Order. As we have indicated, the crucial date is the date of the commencement of the Act. On that date, such of the orders, which could be made under the Act, were continued as if they were made under the Act, and the others automatically lapsed.

Thereafter, there is no question of resuscitating a dead order. The subsequent inclusion of a new article in the schedule could only empower the Government to make an order under S. 3 regulating the production, supply, distribution and price of that article. The transitory provision cannot be given permanent operative force in the scheme of the Act so as to revive lapsed orders and impart to them fictional continuity affecting

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