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1958 Supreme(AP) 30

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
QAMAR HASAN,KUMARAYYA, JJ.
Kamat Reddy Narayan Reddy s/o Venkat Reddy,
Versus
Kamat Reddy Narayan Reddy s/o Kishta Reddy
Letters Patent Appeal No. 46 of 1957 against decree and judgment of Md. Ahmed Ansari, J.
Decided On : 12-02-1958

Advocates:
Devi Prasad Mishra, for Appellant :B.V. Subbarayudu and P. Venkatadri Sastry, for Respondents.

The starting point of limitation for a suit for possession of watan is the date of dispossession.

Headnote:

LIMITATION - SUIT FOR POSSESSION OF WATAN - STARTING POINT OF LIMITATION - HYDERABAD LIMITATION ACT, ART. 106 - INDIAN LIMITATION ACT, ART. 120 - RIGHT TO SUE ACCRUES ON DISPOSSESSION.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiffs filed a suit for possession of watan, alleging dispossession in 1348F. The defendants contended that the limitation period began in 1293H or from the adverse judgment of the Talukdar in 1340F.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the starting point of limitation was the date of dispossession in 1348F, as the right to sue accrued when the plaintiffs were deprived of the emoluments of the watan.

Issues: Whether the suit was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the Privy Council decision in Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan, AIR 1930 PC 270 (E), which held that the right to sue accrues when there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or a clear threat to infringe that right by the defendant.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was within the limitation period.

JUDGMENT : This is a Letters Patent Appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree of our brother Ansari, J. in which he has concurred with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court and held that the suit was within limitation.

2. The only point involved in this appeal is whether the suit on the facts of the case can be said to be beyond time. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, it may be mentioned that the Second Talukdar of Bhongir by his judgment D/-13th Khurdad 1346F. held that the respondents were entitled to the kothwal patel watan of Anantawaram village. As a result of this judgment, the respondent became the incumbent of the watan and began to discharge the duties of police patel and enjoy the emoluments thereof.

3. The appellants being aggrieved by the order of the Second Talukdar went up in appeal to the Collector of Nalgonda, who by his order dated 12th Meher 1346 F., allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Second Talukdar. On a further appeal, the Subedar of Medak by his order dated 30th Aban 1347F. concurred with the view taken by the Collector. On revision being taken by the respondents, the then Revenue Member upheld the orders both of the Subedar as well as the Collector.

4. The respondents after having failed in the Revenue Department filed the instant suit on 2nd Ardibihisht 1354F. alleging that they had been in enjoyment of the watan up to 2nd Khurdad 1348F. and were dispossessed on the said date, and this date they said was the starting point of limitation.

5. The appellant in his reply contended that the limitation began in the year 1293H. All the Courts who had occasion to deal with the case held that since the suit was within six years from the admitted dat3 of dispossession, it will be deemed to be within limitation having regard to the provisions of Art. 106, Hyderabad Limitation Act corresponding to Art. 120, Indian Limitation Act.

6. The learned advocate for the appellant contended that the limitation if not from 1293 would start from the adverse judgment of the Talukdar which was delivered on 12th Meher 1340F. and therefore, the suit would be clearly time-barred. In support of his contention he has referred to Ketireddi v. Abdul Gafoor, 1355 Nazair-e-Hyderabad 363 (A); Babaji v. Bhuvanrao, 24 Dec LR 393 (B) and Venkamina v. Lachmanaraj, 39 Dec LR 235 (C). The learned advocate for the respondents on the other hand relied upon Jitendra Nath Ghose v. Monmoban Ghouse, AIR 1930 PC 193 (D); Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan, AIR 1930 PC 270 (E); Annamalai Chettiar v. Kuthukaruppan Chettiar, AIR 1931 PC 9 (F) and Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh, AIR 1931 PC 89 (G).

7. After giving our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before us, we do not see any reason to differ from the view taken by the Courts below on the question of limitation. It is admitted on all hands that Art. 106, Hyderabad Limitation Act corresponding to Art. 120, Indian Limitation Act applied to the facts of this case. That Article provides a period of six years, for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule, from the date when the right to sue accrues.

The Privy Council in the case of AIR 1930 PC 270 (E), has held that there can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. It is thus to be seen when the infringement of the right which had accrued to the respondents by reason of the judgment of the Second Talukdar took place.

The learned advocate for the appellant contends that the infringement of the right would be deemed to have occurred on the date when the Collector decided against the respondents, that is to say in 1346F. The advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, urges that the right to sue accrued to him when he was



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