The revision petitioner is the respondent in R.C.No.410 of 2011 on the file of the Court of the III-Addl. Rent Controller, Hyderabad. The respondent herein filed the said R.C.No.410 of 2011 under Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, (for short, ‘the Act’) seeking eviction of the revision petitioner from the petition schedule premises. During trial, the respondent herein/the petitioner in R.C.No.410 of 2011 filed his affidavit in lieu of chief-examination. However, the revision petitioner opposed and filed an application (IA (SR) No.999 of 2013) with a prayer to eschew the said chief-examination contending that as per Rule 8 (2) of the Rules made under the Act, the evidence of the parties to the Rent Control case shall be recorded by the Rent Controller in the open Court. The said contention was not accepted by the learned Rent Controller and accordingly by the order under Revision, IA (SR) No.999 of 2013 was rejected. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition by the respondent/tenant in R.C. No.410 of 2011.

Having heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and having perused the material available on record, I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the order under Revision.

The question whether the parties to the Rent Control Case can file affidavits in lieu of chief-examination is no longer res integra.

After considering Rule 8 (2) of the Rules as well as Order 18 Rule 4 of C.P.C. as amended by Act 46 of 1999 and Act 22 of 2002 and after reviewing the decided cases on the issue, this Court held in AVULA RAGHURAMAIAH v. PALLEMPAATI SEETAMMA (2003 (6) ALD 860) that the reception of chief-examination in the form of an affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 of C.P.C. cannot be said to be in any way inconsistent with Rule 8 (2) of the Rules.

In fact, the order under Revision came to be passed by the learned Rent Controller following the ratio laid down by this Court in the very same decision i.e., AVULA RAGHURAMAIAH’S case (1 supra).

However, it is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the ratio laid down in AVULA RAGHURAMAIAH’S case (1 supra) cannot be treated as the correct proposition of law since it is contrary to the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in HARI KISHAN SINGH AND ANOTHER v. B. NARAYAN AND ANOTHER (1969 APLJ 290 (D.B.).

Having carefully gone through the judgment of the Division Bench, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

It is no doubt true that there is no specific provision in the Rent Control Act stating that C.P.C. is applicable to the proceedings under the said Act as far as practicable. However, it was observed by the Division Bench in HARI KISHAN SINGH’S case (2 supra) that absence of such provision do not prevent the application of C.P.C. to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act either in cases where the Act or the Rules do not make any provision or in cases where any of the provisions of C.P.C. are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the Rules or generally to the scheme of the Act.

The Division Bench in HARI KISHAN SINGH’S case (2 supra) was specifically dealing with the question whether a Rent Controller to whose file an application under the Rent Control Act is transferred can act on the evidence of the parties recorded by the Rent Controller from whose file the petition has been transferred. The Division Bench held that the continuation of the proceedings by the succeeding Rent Controller on the basis of the evidence recorded by the previous Rent Controller is permissible under law.

It was also observed by the Division Bench that the Rent Control Act is intended not only as a protection to the tenant but also to give speedy and effective remedy to the landlords and that the proceedings are intended to be summary in nature.

In the light of the scheme of the Rent Control Act and the object sought to be achieved, I