L. Narasimha Reddy, J.

A.S.Nos.82, 83 and 84 of 2013 are filed by the sole plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 2011 in the Court of VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Markapur, for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale, against nine defendants. Three applications, being I.A.Nos.362, 363 and 364 of 2011, were filed by defendants 2 and 4, defendant No.1 and defendant Nos.5 to 9, respectively, under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., with a prayer to reject the plaint. Through a common order, dated 15.02.2012, the trial Court allowed the applications, and thereby, rejected the plaint. Hence, three appeals came to be filed before this Court by the plaintiff.

Raising an objection as to the adequacy of the Court fee paid by the appellant, the respondents filed A.S.M.P.Nos.782, 783 and 784 of 2013, with a prayer to reject the appeals. The appellant, on the other hand, filed a set of applications with a prayer to permit him to pay the deficit Court fee. He has also filed A.S.M.P.No.287 of 2013 with a prayer to restrain the respondents from alienating the suit schedule property.

Since the appeals are against an order of rejection of plaint, we proposed to hear the appeals themselves. However, learned counsel for the respondents insisted that the miscellaneous applications alone be heard. Hence, we propose to dispose of the applications.

Sri Addepalli Suryanarayana, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the Court fee of just Rs.10/- was paid on each appeal and the same is totally untenable. He contends that once the decree is passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit, the same Court fee as was paid in the suit, ought to have been paid in the appeals also. He places reliance upon Section 47 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) and certain precedents. He further contends that the appeals were directed only against the orders passed in the applications filed under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., and no appeal, as such, was filed against the decree that was separately drawn in the suit. With these and other reasons, he prays for rejection of the appeals.

Learned counsel also opposes the application filed for temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from alienating the suit schedule property. He submits that the appellant has undertaken a speculative litigation, and that there was no order of temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit. He contends that, if an order is passed at this stage, it will lead to several problems, apart from causing hardship to the respondents.

Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, submits that the rejection of plaint, though entails in a decree, the amount of Court fee to be paid in the appeal would depend upon the ground, on which the plaint was rejected. He contends that it is only when the rejection is on the grounds mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., that the Court fee quantified by the trial Court, needs to be paid and not when the rejection is under clauses (a) and (d) thereof. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Kumarika Subarna Rekha Mani Devi v. Ramakrishna Deoand (AIR 1968 AP 239). He further submits that the law does not contemplate a separate exercise, in the context of an order passed in an application filed under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., and consequential dismissal of the suit. He contends that it is a compendious exercise and drawing of a decree in the suit, based on an order in an application filed under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., is only a ministerial act.

On the application filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the valuable property is involved and if it is sold or any third party rights are created, even when the appeals are pending, several complications would arise. He contends that the relief of temporary injunction was not sought, when the