1. The petitioner is the sole accused in the First Information Report (FIR) in Crime No.57 of 2014 on the file of Jeelugumilli Police Station, West Godavari District. A complaint was lodged by the 1st respondent against the petitioner, which was registered under Sections 417, 420, 376 and 506 IPC, and under Section 3(1)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the SCs/STs Act, for short).

The petitioner sought for quashment of the FIR through this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

2. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the 1st respondent/de facto complainant and the petitioner entered into a compromise and made a request to compound the case against him.

The offences under Sections 417 and 420 IPC are compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. The offence under Section 506 IPC also is compoundable.

The petitioner allegedly committed the offences under Sections 417, 420 and 506 IPC. The 1st respondent certainly can compound these offences if she has entered into a compromise with the petitioner herein. However, the offence under Section 376 IPC as well as the offence under Section 3(1)(xii) of the SCs/STs Act are not compoundable offences. The question is whether they can be compounded or otherwise.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB ((2012) 10 SCC 303)).

In that case, the petitioner was convicted under Section 420 IPC read with Section 120-B, IPC.

On the ground that the offence under Section 120-B, IPC is not compoundable, the Court refused to record composition of the offence. The petitioner ultimately approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court can exercise inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C and compound the offences. The Supreme Court however cautioned that heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc., or offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants while working in their capacity as public servants could not be quashed even if the victim or the victim’s family offers to settle the dispute as such offences cannot be termed as private offences in nature and since they have serious impact on the society.

4. In Criminal Petition No.894 of 2011, where the accused allegedly committed offences under Sections 323 and 506 IPC as well as under Section 3(1)(x) of the SCs/STs Act, on the ground that the de facto complainant entered into a compromise with the accused, a learned Single Judge of this Court quashed the FIR.

5. In P.Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014 (1) ALD (Crl.) 733 (AP)), placing reliance upon GIAN SINGH (1 supra) this Court quashed the FIR where the case was instituted against the accused under Section 3(1)(x) of the SCs/STs Act and under Section 506 IPC.

6. It may be noticed that the general law is that the inherent powers either under Section 482 Cr.P.C or under Section 151 C.P.C can be invoked only when there is no provision contrary to the order that the Court proposes to pass or there is a provision in the Code dealing with specific situation. Thus, if there is a specific prohibition regarding a particular procedure, Section 482 Cr.P.C may not be invoked on the ground that the Court has inherent powers. It may be noticed that Section 320(9) Cr.P.C envisages that no offence can be compounded except as provided by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Where there is a specific prohibition to compound the offences other than those mentioned in Sections 320(1) and 320(2) Cr.P.C., perhaps such offences cannot be compounded. For instance, the High Court cannot convict an accused for an offence under Section 302 IPC and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 3 years or 4 years on the ground of exercising inherent jurisdiction as the Indian Penal Code provides specific punishment for the offence under Section 302 IPC.

7. It may also be notic